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i 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, the loads needing electrical power in military aircraft and civil jet 
keep increasing, this put huge pressure on the electrical power system (EPS). 
As EPS becomes more powerful and complex, its reliability and maintenance 
becomes difficult problems to designers, manufacturers and customers. To 
improve the mission reliability and reduce life cycle cost, the EPS needs health 
management. 
This thesis developed a set of generic health management methods for the EPS, 
which can monitor system status; diagnose faults/failures in component level 
correctly and predict impending faults/failures exactly and predict remaining 
useful life of critical components precisely. The writer compared a few 
diagnostic and prognostic approaches in detail, and then found suitable ones for 
EPS. Then the major components and key parameters needed to be monitored 
are obtained, after function hazard analysis and failure modes effects analysis 
of EPS. A diagnostic process is applied to EPS using Dynamic Case-based 
Reasoning approach, whilst hybrid prognostic methods are suggested to the 
system. After that, Diagnostic, Prognostic and Health Management architecture 
of EPS is built up in system level based on diagnostic and prognostic process. 
Finally, qualitative evaluations of DPHM explain given.  
This research is an extension of group design project (GDP) work, the GDP 
report is arranged in the Appendix A,  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Objectives  
The secondary power of the aircraft generally comprises electric, hydraulic and 
pneumatic, which are off-take from engines.  Each kind of power has its own 
power generation, distribution and control components, making a complex 
secondary power system. This hybrid secondary power is low cost-efficiency for 
the considerable power loss in the power conversion and transfer. 
In order to improve power efficiency, researchers and designers managed to 
reduce the types of secondary power to simplify the system architecture and 
achieve power optimization, by using electric power to replace other power 
source. The notion of more-electric aircraft（MEA）, and all-electric aircraft 
(AEA) came to our eyes towards this kind of power optimization. In an MEA, the 
electric power replaces the hydraulics to power the flight control system, landing 
gears retraction etc or substitutes the bleed-air system to power the 
environment control system. The above all drives the increase in electrical 
power capacity. For instance, the main electric power capacity is about 300KVA 
in traditional aircraft, such as Airbus A-340, and the number is doubled in new 
generation aircraft-Airbus A-380，while it even reaches 1M VA in Boeing-787 
dream liner! [23]The architecture of Electrical Power Systems (EPS) becomes 
more and more complex with increasing requirement of power capacity as well 
as power quality. Therefore, problems rose in terms of these trends, that is, how 
can we reduce the failure rate of EPS in all the flight phase or mission?  How 
can we detect the fault in EPS in its incipiency? How can we estimate the 
remaining useful life (RUL) of a major component of EPS? How can the life 
cycle cost of system be reduced? 
To answer these questions, the writer intends to develop a set of health 
management methods which meet the electrical power system needs. The 
writer also would: 
Choose EPS in Group Design Project (GDP) as the case study. 
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Consider two subsystems of EPS, that is, power generation, power distribution 
(primary distribution and secondary distribution). 
However, the detection and measurement techniques, for instance, sensors and 
probes, are less concerned in this thesis, in terms of limited time.  
1.2 Diagnostic, Prognostic and Health Management (DPHM) 
background 
“Health management concept is the capability to make appropriate decisions 
about maintenance actions based on real-time monitoring, diagnosis and 
prognosis information, available resources, and operational demand.” [19; 
24]This concept has been applied in the space shuttles and international space 
station for years [28],  the ground based and monitoring centre could receive 
and analyse the real-time status data, and then respond. In recent years, the 
aircraft manufacturers like Boeing and Lockheed-Martin developed the 
technology respectively [28], aiming to prognostic the failure optimizes the 
system architecture, reduce redundancies, and integrate the supply chain and 
lower operational cost. 
EPS provide power not only to flight-critical loads, like flight control system, but 
also to non-essential loads, such as the entertainment system on board. 
Accordingly, to detect and acquire the operating status of EPS is very important 
to the whole aircraft. Therefore, the DPHM technology is introduced into the 
design of the aircraft electrical power system. The DPHM system could monitor 
and analyse operating status of EPS in real-time, transmitting health data to the 
ground base. As a consequence, the development of DPHM in EPS is able to 
further improve system reliability. Till now, health management technology is a 
novel notion for electrical power system on board, which might provide a new 
design philosophy and synthesis for the design. 
3 
1.3  Methodology  
The writer intended to develop generic DPHM methodology in EPS of the 
aircraft with a design flow as follows. 
Firstly, the author chose the architecture of EPS of Flying Crane as a case 
study, Here, Flying Crane is an advanced jet liner designed in the group design 
project (GDP) [5]. 
Secondly, monitoring all the components of EPS is unnecessary, because it will 
increase complexity and cost. Hence, it is suitable to monitor the key 
parameters and major components in EPS. The writer conducts functional 
hazard analysis (FHA) to judge primary functions and hazard levels. Then, the 
failure modes effect criticality analysis (FMECA) would be performed to rank the 
failure mode and get the critical components in EPS. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
is used to ensure no other failures are missed. 
Thirdly, the writer will diagnose and prognose the selected components of EPS, 
by using appropriate diagnostic methods and prognostic approaches to 
components respectively. Then, build the architecture of DPHM for electrical 
power system. 
Finally, an evaluation will be performed of the DPHM system. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Health management history and trends 
Diagnostic, Prognostic and Health Management (DPHM) developed from 
traditional status monitoring technologies. Over forty years, with the increasing 
quality and complexity of system and equipment, DPHM has undergone several 
stages: exterior test of system, Built-In Test (BIT), Testability being an 
independent subject, proposal and development of synthetically diagnosis, 
Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM), prognostic and health management 
(PHM).  
2.1.1 From exterior test to Built-In Test (BIT) 
Early-generation aircraft relied on manual detection and isolation of problems 
on the ground [41]  .These systems typically were analogue and independent of 
one another. They needed measurement instruments, such as a voltmeter, to 
link and measure. In this stage, diagnosis is difficult and the fault is not easy to 
find. In most circumstance, the operators’ experiences played an important role 
in diagnosis.  
After that, some flight-critical systems and equipments, for instance, the avionic 
system, required to be monitored, so that the operators could be clear about the 
working status. If there are any faults, the operators could take some actions in 
time. Therefore, BIT was employed. At first, BIT was used to test a few critical 
parameters, while the judgement of fault was employed by hand. As aircraft 
systems became more complicated and integrated, more powerful BIT was 
required, which led to the appearance of BITE (Built-In Test Equipment) BITE 
could detect and isolate faults automatically, However, BITE results at that time 
were often confusing, not reliable, and difficult to use. [41] It was applied to 
many systems on airplanes such as the Boeing 707, and the McDonnell 
Douglas DC-8 [18] . 
6 
2.1.2 Testability being an independent subject 
With the development of exterior test and built-in test, the problem of test design 
increased. For the complex systems and components, the fault diagnosis 
needed exterior test and built-in test synthetically. Also, the design of BIT/BITE 
should be embedded into systems. Hence, the system should consider the 
testability design. In 1985, United States Department of Defense issued 
TESTABILITY PROGRAM FOR ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENTS 
(MIL-STD-2165) [1]. In this standard, testability was put on the same level with 
reliability and maintainability for design requirement of product. It means that 
testability becomes an independent subject. 
2.1.3 Proposal and development of synthetically diagnosis  
Synthetically diagnosis was brought forward by National Defense Industrial 
Association (NDIA) of U.S. [40] In 1983, and it aimed at detecting and isolating 
all the faults, including incipient faults, effectively in minimum cost. Synthetically 
diagnosis was not a new technique or combination of techniques, but a process 
of engineering system.  It was performed in the beginning of system design and 
went through the life cycle of a product. For instance, central fault display 
system (CFDS) using one display to get the maintenance indications for all the 
systems on the airplane. Many of the systems on later Boeing 737s, the Airbus 
A320 family and the McDonnell Douglas MD11, employ this techniques [18].  
In the 1990s, the ARINC 624 was developed to solve the problem that a single 
fault on an airplane could cause fault indications for many systems. Central 
Maintenance System (CMS) or Onboard Maintenance System (OMS) were 
used to combine the information of failure or fault from multiple systems and 
provide extra aid to support condition-based maintenance. For example, 
systems on the Boeing 747-400 and 777 airplanes monitor certain bus data by 
using the integrated maintenance system [18].  
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2.1.4 CBM and PHM introduced  
These years, condition-based maintenance (CBM) and prognostics and health 
management (PHM) emerged to reduce operation and support cost, and bring a 
revolutionary maintenance concept. The technology mainly focuses on 
employing various sensors onboard an aircraft, while the monitoring software 
decodes the output data from these sensors automatically. PHM can estimate 
the remaining useful lifetime or time to failure of a failing component, and 
arrange logistics in advance [18]  .Aircraft can get maximum availability and 
capability under this concept. PHM was adopted for the F-35 to keep logistical 
system minimization and get maximum sortie generation rate with the lowest 
cost.  
At present, the major obstacles lie in the assessment of uncertainty of the 
remaining useful lifetime or time, and detect the intermittent failure of electric 
product [40].  
2.2 Categories of Diagnosis 
Diagnosis, as an important part of health management, detects and identifies an 
impending or incipient failure condition [18] .A simple diagnostic process could 
be found in three steps as shown in Figure 2-1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Typical diagnostic process [4] 
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“Many engineering disciplines have specific approaches to model, monitor and 
diagnose anomalous conditions, Therefore, there is no “one-size-fits-all” 
approach, which could build diagnostic and health monitoring capabilities for a 
system” [4]. For fault diagnosis, different authors defined different categories. In 
ref [11] , fault diagnosis typically separates into two major categories: model-
based and data-driven approaches. While according to Robert Milne [35], fault 
diagnosis can be divided into analytical model-based, knowledge-based and 
data-driven approaches.  
The author adopted a classification suggested by [4] , which includes four 
categories for intelligent systems: 
z Rule-based expert system 
z Case-based reasoning system 
z Model-based reasoning system 
z Learning system 
2.2.1 Rule-based expert reasoning system  
Rule-based expert reasoning system is a typical artificial intelligence technique. 
The basic reasoning rule statement is “if-then-else” [29]. These “rules” are 
particular sentences and the reasoning engine will search for these sentences 
in the rules that match patterns in the data. The meaning of "if" is "when the 
condition is true," the "then" represents "adopt behaviour 1" and the "else" 
implies "when the condition is wrong, adopt behaviour 2” [24]. The maintainers 
could load a series of rules into the database of a rule-based expert system, 
from which the diagnostic solutions could be suggested. [4]. 
2.2.2 Case-based reasoning (CBR) system  
Case-based reasoning system is a specific reasoning engine of knowledge 
solutions which means to use past problem to solve current problems [4]. It 
employs both qualitative and quantitative algorithms of reasoning by learning 
from old cases. It uses a case library of maintenance to record all previous 
incidents, faults, and malfunctions of equipment. This technique works well in 
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the condition of poorly understood problem areas [4] . Figure 2-2 shows the 
process of CBR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2 The Retrieve-Reuse-Revise-Retain Process [4] 
2.2.3 Model-based reasoning system 
 Model-based reasoning is” a broad category that describes the use of a wide 
variety of engineering models as the foundation for the knowledge and the 
techniques applied for diagnoses”.[4] This kind of technique has been used in 
the electrical power system such as Deep Space and Earth Observing 
applications as diagnostics and troubleshooting [4; 29]. 
2.2.4 Learning systems 
Learning systems are data-driven approaches that are derived directly from 
routinely monitored system operating data. These data could be calibration, 
power, vibration, temperature, pressure, oil debris, currents or voltages. 
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Learning systems depend on the presupposition that the statistical 
characteristics of the data are stable unless an unanticipated failure event was 
found in the system [4; 29]. 
2.2.5 Comparison of diagnostic approaches 
The four diagnostic approaches mentioned in above chapters have different 
advantages and drawbacks respectively, which were developed by 
manufactures or researchers severally, which focus on application to the 
particular systems or components. The writer made a comparison with these 
four methods to choose one of them as a tool for studying EPS. 
Approach Advantages Drawbacks Application 
Rule 
based 
Increased reliability 
for diagnostic 
decision making 
Domain knowledge 
acquisition step 
translate into rules 
Small systems 
(used by NASA)[4]
Case 
based 
Use past problems in 
case library to solve 
current problems 
Hard to obtain a 
completeness of case 
base  
Gas turbine (used 
by GE)[18] 
Model 
based 
Efficient and accurate 
in linear dynamic 
systems 
Hard to non-linear 
complex behaviours 
Power industry, 
space craft etc 
Learning 
Lower dimension of 
noisy data and 
provide monitor 
Need long term 
historical data record 
Pattern 
recognition  
Table 2-1 Comparison of four diagnostic approaches 
2.3 Category of Prognosis 
“From the users’ point of view, what distinguishes prognosis from diagnosis is 
the provision of a lead time or warning time to the useful life or failure and that 
this time window is far enough ahead for the appropriate action to be taken” [18]. 
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In PHM, the term “prognostics” covers not only the functions of fault/failure 
detection, fault/failure isolation, but also the functions of enhanced diagnostics, 
material condition, performance monitoring, and life tracking, rather than just 
prognostic functions alone[9]. Figure 2-3 shows briefly a set of possible 
prognosis approaches, which are applied to various systems, besides, the trend 
of their relative accuracy and implementation cost are also illustrated[18] .Three 
main approaches are given in the following sections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3 Prognostic technical approaches [18] 
2.3.1 Model-based prognosis techniques 
Model-based approach employs a dynamic model to predict, which includes 
physics-based models, autoregressive moving-average (ARMA) techniques, 
Kalman/particle filtering, and empirical-based methods [18] .Model-based 
approaches have advantages that they make remaining useful life(RUL) 
estimates even without any measurable events, however, when the related 
diagnostic data is provided, the model could be adjusted based on this 
diagnostic data. Figure 2-4 shows a schematic of physics based modelling 
approach, which belongs to model-based. 
Prognostic approach
Experienced-based 
prognostics ( failure PDFs, 
few sensors or model) 
Evolutionary or trending 
models (data-driven, 
feature-based correlation)
Model-based 
Prognostics
(failure physics, sensing, 
function)
In
cr
ea
si
ng
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os
t a
nd
 
ac
cu
ra
cy
Range of system applicability
Physical
models
Classification methods, 
fuzzy logic, NN, state 
estimation module 
Generic, statistical life 
usage algorithms
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Figure 2-4 Physics-model based approach [31] 
2.3.2 Probability-based prognosis techniques 
Probability-based approach is effective in the situations of statistical failure 
points supplied by historical or experimental data. These methods have less 
information demands than model-based methods, for the reason that the 
information belongs to various probability density functions (PDFs). [18] These 
PDFs generally include Bayesian Probability Theory, Weibull Distribution model 
and Remaining Useful Life Probability Density Function. Figure 2-5 gives an 
example of Weibull Distribution.  
2.3.3 Data-driven prediction techniques 
In many cases, the prediction is difficult to get although the historical or 
statistical data has been obtained. Therefore, the data-driven approach 
provides a nonlinear network method which is able to be tuned by the fixed 
formal algorithms so as to get the prediction outputs. “Nonlinear networks 
include the neural network, which is based on signal-processing techniques in 
biologic nervous systems, and fuzzy-logic systems, which are based on the 
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linguistic and reasoning abilities of humans.” [18] Figure 2-6 shows a neural-
network prognosis schematic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-5 an example of probability-based approach [31] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-6 Neural-Network schematic [31] 
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2.4 Typical faults in EPS 
In the writer’s view, faults in EPS can be divided into three parts, that is, power 
supply faults, power control and distribution faults and loads faults.  
Power supply is composed of main generators, emergency generator, batteries 
and external power. The winding wore out is a common phenomenon. The 
Figure-4 shows motor bearing arc failure. Another case is the degradation of 
batteries [7; 26] . 
Power distribution comprises the bus bars, various kinds of contactors, SSPCs 
and wires, cables, etc. Among them, the wire arc and wire aging is difficult to 
detect. In fact, the wire ageing and insulated protection was hot topic in recent 
years [27]. 
Electrical loads are increasingly complex in MEA, which also raises a challenge 
to electrical power capacity and reliability. Typical loads are actuators, fuel 
pump/valves, and fans etc, which are critical in flight. 
In this thesis, the faults of loads are not considered due to the short time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-7 Motor and bearing arc caused failure from NASA [2] 
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3 EPS Selection and Analysis 
The Electrical Power System mainly provides power to all the loads in an 
aircraft, and it becomes more and more complicated with increasing loads 
requirement these days. Consequently, a highly reliable system with fault/ 
failure easily detected or isolated is required by designers, manufacturers and 
customers. A generic health management for EPS would be developed in this 
thesis, and the writer will choose one kind of EPS in civil aircraft as case study. 
The EPS of Flying Crane, which is the aircraft designed in the writer’s Group 
Design Project, is selected. Firstly, the architecture of EPS of Flying Crane will 
be introduced in this chapter, and then detailed analysis from the point of 
function and safety will be performed, from which the critical components and 
their associated parameters in EPS would be determined. 
3.1 Introduction of EPS of Flying Crane 
Flying Crane jet liner is 130-seat mainly for China’s domestic market in 2020, 
and it is designed as an all-electric aircraft. That is to say, electrical power 
becomes the only kind of secondary power, replacing the work of hydraulics 
and pneumatics totally [5] . 
Flying Crane has a power generation capacity of 500kVA supplied by two 
250kVA variable frequency (VF) starter/generators (230V/ 360-720Hz). A 90 
KVA VF generator powered by the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) could switch to 
work in emergency conditions. A hybrid system is employed in the aircraft, 
which could provide 230V AC, 270VDC, 28VDC and 115VAC/400Hz operating 
voltages to drive the various airframe systems.  The primary power distribution 
is supplied by two Primary Power Distribution Units (PPDUs), while, six 
Electrical Loads Management Centres (ELMCs) transform and manage power 
to the loads [10] . 
The two 90 Ah Ni-Cd batteries make sure that there is no power break. The 
working status of batteries is monitored and controlled by Battery Charger 
Rectifier Units (BCRU). The Ram Air Turbine (RAT) will be extended 
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automatically while all the generators fail and provide the crew with sufficient 
power while attempting to restore the primary generators or carry out a 
diversion to the nearest airfield [23]  .The overall system is fully automatic 
achieved by utilizing the solid state devices. The mass of wiring in the system is 
reduced by utilizing the remote power distribution architecture which has been 
used in B777 and B787, also, reliability and maintainability are improved. The 
design of EPS in Flying Crane complies with China Civil Aviation Regulations 
(CCAR)-25. 
The author found a few problems in the architecture of EPS in the stage of GDP: 
a. The EPS of Flying Crane provides four types of electric power, that is 230V 
VF AC, 115v 400 Hz AC, 270 V DC, and 28V DC power, which seems 
complicated.  
b. Another question is the mismatching between the ground power supply and 
main power, which will decrease the reliability of EPS.  
To make the architecture simple and clear, the writer discussed with EPS 
designer, and made a few modifications to the system.  
a. The power supply voltage of main start/generators changes from 230v to 
115v, which is matching with the voltage of ground power. Hence, the power 
type becomes 115V VF, 115v 400 Hz AC, 270 V DC, and 28V DC. 
b. The ground power input adapts each main AC bus, for the reason that “the 
aircraft generators are variable frequency (VF) and the frequency of the AC 
power depends upon the speed of the appropriate engine, the primary AC 
buses cannot be parallel [23] .” 
In the following pages, the architecture of EPS and typical secondary power 
distribution are represented.  
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Figure 3-1 Architecture of EPS of Flying Crane [10]
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Figure 3-2  Components of PPDU of Flying Crane 
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Figure 3-3 Typical Secondary Power Distribution of Flying Crane
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The table below expresses some typical components of the EPS, in the left 
column, they are power components, whilst in the right column, the loads of 
EPS are listed. 
Item  Component (Power) Item Component (Loads) 
1 Variable Frequency Generators 16 
Electric powered 
actuators 
2 APU Generator 17 Fuel pump 
3 Ram Air Turbine 18 Fuel valve 
4 Battery 19 Fans 
5 Generator Control Unit 20 Indicated light 
6 Generator Circuit Breaker 21 Lights 
7 Bus Tie Breaker 22 Galley 
8 Bus Power Control Unit 23 Sensors 
9 Low/ High Transfer Rectifier Unit 24 Probes 
10 Frequency Modulator   
11 Static Inverter   
12 
Electrical Loads Management 
Centre 
  
13 Circuit Breaker   
14 Solid State Power Controller   
15 wires, cables   
Table 3-1 Electrical Bill of Material (EBOM) of EPS 
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The writer needs to analyse the failures mode effect of the components in left 
column, so as to isolate specific parts. However, the failure modes effect of 
loads are not developed in this thesis, because the loads are various and 
complicated. 
3.2 Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) of EPS 
3.2.1 Introduction of FHA 
The electrical power system transforms and manages power to different loads 
in the aircraft, among them; it should provide no-break power to critical loads in 
the emergency conditions. The design should be compliant with CCAR-25.1351 
and be compatible with the aircraft level safety requirements. To meet the 
safety consideration in CCAR-25.1309, a FHA must be implemented to the EPS, 
from the results of FHA, all of the catastrophic, hazardous, major and minor 
failure conditions in EPS design are identified, which the system may cause, or 
contribute to, by malfunction, failure to operate, or as normal response to any 
unusual or abnormal external factor [29] . 
The FHA provides the data on fault symptoms needed to test the EPS; hence it 
is helpful to develop the FMECA and other analyses. 
3.2.2 Failure Condition Severity and Effect Classifications 
To measure the worst potential effect due to the system failure, the 
airworthiness regulations classify five kinds of failure condition severities 
according to different effects to aeroplane, flight crew and occupants [16] . 
They are: 
Category I (Catastrophic) 　 A failure may cause multiple fatalities and hull loss; 
Category II (Hazardous) 　 A failure may cause severe injury, property damage 
or mission loss; 
Category III (Major) 　 A failure may cause minor injury, property damage or 
mission delay or degradation; 
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Category IV (Minor) 　 A failure may not cause minor injury or some degree 
economic loss, but it may result in unscheduled maintenance or repair. 
“The safety objectives associated with Catastrophic Failure Conditions, may be 
satisfied by demonstrating that: 
(1) No single failure will result in a Catastrophic Failure Condition; and 
(2) Each Catastrophic Failure Condition is Extremely Improbable. “[16] 
3.2.3 FHA Summary of EPS  
The FHA of EPS of Flying Crane was performed by Mr Chen in the Group 
Design Project stage, and the writer made some modifications corresponding to 
the updated architecture of EPS. The detailed results of FHA are listed in 
Appendix B. 
The result of FHA shows that the function of controlling the system 
independently among different DC channels, and the function of vital and 
essential loads power supply control will great influence the flight safety and 
system performance. For the next research work, the table 3.2 list the failure 
conditions catastrophic and hazardous which are directly from Appendix B. 
Failure condition Severity 
Loss of 28VDC channels controllability operating 
independently  
Catastrophic 
Loss of 270VDC channels controllability operating 
independently  
Catastrophic 
Loss of vital loads power supply control Catastrophic 
Loss of Essential loads power supply control Catastrophic 
Loss of 115V/400Hz channels controllability 
operating independently  
Hazardous 
Loss of main feeder protection Hazardous 
Loss of Busbar protection Hazardous 
Table 3-2 Summary of EPS function hazardous assessment 
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3.3 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis of EPS 
3.3.1 Introduction of FMECA 
The objective of an FMECA is to” identify all modes of failure within a system; 
its first purpose is the early identification of all catastrophic and critical design 
correction at the earliest possible time.” [15] FMECA ranks each failure mode 
according to a severity classification of failure mode and probability of 
occurrence. Generally, FMECA could deploy two steps: 
a) Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) 
It is used to analyse the effect of failures on the system and to classify every 
potential failure by severity so as to obtain the basis of constituting design, 
improving process and taking compensated measure [16] . 
b) Criticality analysis (CA) 
Each failure mode is ranked according to the combined influence of severity 
classification and probability of occurrence, which evaluates generally all kinds 
of possible effects of failure modes. The CA is an extension or supplement of 
the FMEA and is based on the FMEA [16] . 
3.3.2 Analysis approaches 
When FMEA is performed, each single item failure is to be considered the only 
failure in the system [16] . 
According to [16], there are two primary means for accomplishing an FMEA.  
One is the hardware approach, which lists hardware items exhaustive and 
analyzes their possible failure modes.  
The other is the functional approach. As each item is designed to carry out 
several functions, it needs to be recognized and then be classified as outputs. 
The outputs are listed and their failure modes analyzed.  
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For complex systems, for instance, electrical power system, a combination of 
the functional and hardware approaches may be considered.  
The CA has qualitative approach and quantitative approaches. The qualitative 
approach is suitable for the case that the product technology state or failure rate 
data is not available. The quantitative approach is suitable for the product 
technology state or failure rate data is sufficient [16] . 
3.3.3 FMECA Summary of EPS 
FMECA is an interactive process and it goes through the whole design flow, 
whereas, the FMECA here is based on the preliminary design of EPS. The 
result of FMECA can be seen in Appendix C. 
3.4 Fault Tree Analysis of EPS 
3.4.1 Introduction of FTA 
“To design systems that work correctly we often need to understand and correct 
how they can go wrong” (Dan Goldin, NASA Administrator, 2000) [13] FTA 
identifies, models and evaluates the unique interrelationship of events leading 
to failure, undesired events/ states and unintended events/ states [29] .The 
development of FTA is based on the results of FHA and FMECA.  
FTA is a top-down approach and it can identify the root causes using a 
deductive mode (general to the specific). It also provides risk assessment, 
employing cut sets to get qualitative results and calculating probability to get 
quantitative results. 
3.4.2 Basic Reliability Equations 
Generally, the probability of basic event can be calculated to measure the 
reliability.  
Equation 3-1 TR e λ−=  
Equation 3-2 1R Q+ =  
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Equation 3-3 1 1 TQ R e λ−= − = −  
Where R= Reliability or probability of success, Q= Unreliability or probability of 
failure, λ=component failure rate= 1/MTBF, T= time interval (mission time or 
exposure time ) 
From the equations, it can be inferred that the longer the mission time or 
exposure time, the higher the probability of failure; the smaller the failure rate, 
the lower the probability of failure [12]. 
3.4.3 Calculation of Top Event Probability of EPS 
The calculation of top event probability is in accordance with Boolean algebra; 
however, the probability of the basic events must be got. The fault tree 
architecture can be seen in the Appendix D. Through the fault tree architecture, 
the writer got the relation between the top events and basic events.  It shows 
that no single component leads to a catastrophic event. So the architecture of 
EPS is reasonable. Table 3-3 expresses the result of failure probability.  
Failure condition Severity Required 
Probability 
Calculated 
Probability 
Loss of 28VDC power Catastrophic 10-9 2.18×10-19 
Loss of 270VDC power Catastrophic 10-9 6.3×10-13 
Loss of 115V/400Hz AC power Hazardous 10-7 6.3×10-12 
Table 3-3 Results of FTA 
From the above table, it can be seen that the calculated result is far smaller 
than the expected. Although it meets the required probability from FHA, the 
calculated data is impractical. This reason lies that the writer built the fault tree 
architecture without consideration of failure rate of the wires and connectors. 
For the preliminary design phase, these parameters are unobtainable. After 
consulting safety and reliability designers, the writer took the wires and 
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connectors as a whole event and put them to the higher level, and then got the 
reasonable failure rate of top events.  
3.5 Summary and discussion 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the crucial components to be 
monitored based on the results of FHA, FMECA and FTA. FHA stands at the 
system level to analyse the functional hazard. FMECA ranks the failure mode of 
the components. FTA identifies the root cause of a failure, so that any 
catastrophic can not be resulting from a single failure. According to these 
analyses, the components that can lead to hazardous or catastrophic effect are 
identified. The key parameters and monitoring methods related to these 
components can be acquired, either. The table 3-5 shows the detailed 
information of required parameters and components. 
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Failure condition Loss of 28v DC power supply 
Severity Related component Parameters Detection 
method 
Catastrophic two main generators, 
APU generator, RAT, 
batteries, BTB, GCB, 
LTR, ESS TR 
voltage, 
current, 
control signal
voltmeter, 
ammeter, 
CMS 
Failure condition Loss of 270v DC power supply 
Severity Related component Parameters Detection 
method 
Catastrophic two main generators, 
APU generator, RAT, 
BTB, GCB, HTR, ESS 
TR, DC/DC converter 
voltage, 
current, 
control signal
voltmeter, 
ammeter, 
CMS 
Failure condition Loss of 115v/400HZ power supply 
Severity Related component Parameters Detection 
method 
Hazardous two main generators, 
APU generator, STAT 
INV, BTB, GCB, 
Frequency Modulator 
voltage, 
current, 
control signal
voltmeter, 
ammeter, 
CMS 
Table 3-4 Analysis results of EPS 
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4 DIAGNOSIS RESEARCH FOR EPS 
In this chapter, a diagnostic method will be developed based on the techniques 
review and selections of critical components of EPS. Firstly, the Case Based 
Reasoning (CBR) would be chosen from the four diagnostic approaches 
mentioned in chapter 2. Secondly, the writer discusses the design flow and 
challenges of this approach. Thirdly, the Dynamic Case Based Reasoning 
(DCBR) will be introduced into work, and then a diagnostic architecture of EPS 
will be built based on this technique. 
4.1 Chosen of diagnosis approaches 
Case Based Reasoning was chosen mainly based on the following comparison 
of the characteristics between the four diagnostic approaches. 
As mentioned before, the Rule-based expert system executes diagnostic tasks 
from a hypothesis, and uses a conflict set to solve problem. Its advantages 
include an increase in the availability and reusability of expertise. However, the 
challenges of Rule-based expert systems include domain knowledge acquisition 
and the completeness, consistency and correctness of the derived rule base for 
the complex systems [4] . 
The Model-based Reasoning system uses the engineering models from the real 
and basic products to diagnose the system, and it is very efficient and accurate 
for a linear dynamic systems. The drawbacks of this technique exist, also. The 
difficulty of acquiring accurate model for the non-linear and complex system is 
its bottle neck [4]. Particularly, it is difficult for the writer to build the diagnostic 
model for the EPS in two months, and the lack of detailed product parameters in 
preliminary design stage is another reason.  
Learning system belongs to the data-driven approaches, and it could identify 
the special noise caused by faults and provide the monitoring capability. 
However, learning system needs long term historical data record to improve the 
precision of diagnosis [4] . 
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Case-based Reasoning system uses the past problems in the case library to 
solve the current problems, and it is well suited for poorly understood problem 
areas. However, the challenge lies in achieving completeness of case base [4] . 
According to the above comparison and analysis, the Case-based Reasoning 
system is suitable for the diagnostic development of EPS. In the following 
paragraph, the CBR will be discussed detailed and applied into EPS. 
4.2 Structure of Case-based Reasoning system 
Case-based reasoning system makes use of “4R” to diagnose the faults of the 
systems, where “4R” is Retrieve, Reuse, Revise and Retain respectively. A new 
problem is matched against cases in the case library, and one or more similar 
cases would be retrieved [38]. A solution suggested by the matching cases then 
would be reused and tested. Generally, the solution probably will have to be 
revised, unless the retrieved case is a close match, after that, a new case would 
be retained. Case revision (i.e., adaptation) is often carried out by the managers 
of the case base [18]  .The structure of CBR is illustrated in Figure 4-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1 The structure of CBR [18] 
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4.3 Challenges of Case-based Reasoning design 
When the writer begins to design the CBR diagnostic architecture for EPS, two 
major challenges might to be considered, which are coding of cases and 
adaptation. 
4.3.1 Challenge 1: Coding 
To describe specific situations, the data to be coded must achieve a desired 
level of abstraction. Meanwhile, the coding scheme should address both 
quantitative and qualitative information. A case, therefore, might have the 
following fields: [18] 
• Condition. Shows the conditions of components currently  
• Measurement. Measurements or features of case, they can be qualitative and 
quantitative 
• Symptom (optional). Other unusual observations complementary 
• Component. Describes the component affected and the related fault 
• Action. Shows the solutions or actions adopted before 
• Result. Describes the success and failures associated with the preceding 
actions 
• Explanation. Includes an explanation why a particular decision was taken [18] 
An example of case combination is shown in Figure 4-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2 a case with its components (Adapted from GEORGE 
VACHTSEVANOS etc. 2006) 
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4.3.2 Challenge 2: Adaptation 
In many circumstances, a case queried from the case library might not be the 
exact solution. An adapted solution, therefore, must be created so as to match 
the input problem description as closely as possible [18] ; Figure 4-3 shows the 
relationship between the input problem description and adapted solution. In 
general, there are two methods, interpolation and extrapolation, used to solve 
these problems.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4-3 A schematic of an adapted solution [18]  
4.4 Dynamic Case-based Reasoning  
Dynamic Case-based Reasoning (DCBR) is a variation of Case-based 
Reasoning system, providing continuous updating of cases over time. The core 
of the “dynamic” feature of the CBR is to store a statistic corresponding to 
different situations in a single case, and it is difference from those storing 
several cases of a similar configuration [18] . 
The case identification mechanism of DCBR works like this:  
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When a problem is identified as a case, it will be compared to the old cases in 
the base. If it is a new case, the data base would update to include this case. 
Else if the case has some similarity with old cases, the old ones would be 
updated so as to contain the new features. Figure 4-4 illustrates the operating 
process of DCBR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-4 Operating process of DCBR [18]  
4.5 DCBR Solution for EPS 
It is unnecessary to monitor and diagnose everything in the EPS, from the point 
of economy, what is more, the complex and great numbers of sensors will 
degrade the reliability of the monitors.  
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In chapter3, the critical components and related parameters have been 
discussed and selected. According to these, DCBR techniques will be applied to 
them. A diagnosis flow chart of EPS is designed by using DCBR methods, as 
shown in Figure 4-5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-5 Fault Diagnostic flowchart for EPS using DCBR 
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From the flowchart, the diagnostic process is given as follow: 
a. When the EPS operating, the sensors and probes monitor the system and 
collect the abnormal signals. 
b. The abnormal signals would be pre-processed (filter to lower noise and 
magnify signal) and transformed to a processor unit, called Diagnostic, 
Prognostic Processing Unit,  
c. Before the diagnosis, the collected signal is translated into the specific 
sentence so as to be identified by the case base. The basic sentences 
include three types:  “A IS B”, “A IN B” and “A AT B”, which mean A is_type 
B, A when B, A in_state B respectively [18] . 
d. A similar case would be searched for in the case library, in order to match 
the symptom as closely as possible.  
e. Comparing the selected case with symptom, if they match exactly, the case 
library would suggest a feasible solution, corresponding to the symptom. 
f. Else if they are not similar in detail or the feedback from maintenance 
addresses that the suggested actions fails to solve, another case would be 
searched for in the library.  
g. If there is no case available, a warning will be issued and maintainers must 
seek expert assistance to make a new solution to solve the problem. 
h. When the problem is solved successfully, what has done would be saved as 
a new case into the library. 
4.6 Summary and discussion 
Case-based reasoning system uses a case library and adopts an approach of 
search then answer. The management of case store and retrieve needs a 
particular coding; besides, to match the input problem closely, a case would be 
adapted in general. The dynamic case-based reasoner is a variation of CBR, 
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and it uses a statistic to answer the similar problems, which saves the data 
space and time in searching. 
The diagnostic process of EPS has been discussed in the above paragraph, it 
can be inferred that the operators will maintain the systems frequently in the 
early stage, because of fewer cases in the library. With growing completeness 
of the library, less of maintainers’ actions would be needed. On the other hand, 
it is important that feedback from maintenance. The feedback could evaluate 
the case, increasing/ decreasing the success rate of case. 
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5 PROGNOSTIC RESEARH FOR EPS 
In this chapter, an appropriate prognostic method would be found for EPS. 
Firstly, the writer discusses the characteristics of three prognostic approaches 
mentioned in chapter 2. Secondly, the failure symptom of EPS will be analysed. 
Finally, a feasible prognostic approach would be suggested for EPS. 
5.1 Features of Prognostic Methods 
Probability-based approach is a basic prognostic method based on a great deal 
number of historical statistical data, which is constituted by fault points. From 
the distribution of the fault points, it can infer the stage of high frequency fault in 
the whole life-cycle of a production. This technique could be applied into many 
fields for the low cost; however, its accuracy of prognostic is low also, compared 
to other two solutions. 
Data-driven prediction techniques derive from probability-based techniques, and 
are used in the place where the prediction is hard to make although the fault 
points exist. Data-driven techniques employ a nonlinear network, for instance, 
Artificial Neural Network (ANN), to find the subtle relation among the providing 
data.  
Model-based approach builds up models to simulate the working status of a 
component or system, so that it could predict the RUL of an object based on the 
simulation results. The prediction accuracy is high relatively, but its cost is high 
as well. Besides, it is difficult to grasp the functional rule of a specific object; 
meanwhile, building and updating a model according to the feedback of 
prediction is troublesome and low efficiency. 
5.2 Failure Characteristic of EPS 
Electrical Power system is mainly divided into three parts, the power generation 
subsystem, the power distribution subsystem and the loads. As digital and 
integrated manufacture techniques develop, the components of EPS tend to be 
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modular and highly integrated. Increasing numbers of EPS products turn to the 
type of electronic and electro-mechanical.  
When the writer uses MTBF to estimate the failure rate of a component, it can 
be seen that the failure rate is a small constant value. However, in fact, the 
statistic shows the failure rate of electric/electronic components follow a bathtub 
curve [14] .The Figure 5-1 shows a bathtub curve, it can be seen that in the 
early stage and end of life of products, the failure rate is high, while it is low 
when the component works steadily. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1 The Bathtub Curve [14] 
One of the prognostic tasks is to predict the remaining useful life and find the 
working point that the components work correctly as long as possible before 
they wear out. After analysis to the EPS, it can be inferred that the useful life of 
components are related with temperature and humidity, vibrations, shock and 
power quality. Besides, the extreme operating conditions can exaggerate the 
probability of system failure. 
41 
5.3 Prognostic approach for EPS 
The above chapters analyse the features of three prognostic approaches, and 
failure symptom of EPS. It can conclude that none of the methods is suitable for 
the entire electrical power system from the point of cost and accuracy. 
Therefore, the feasible solution would be given at components level, 
corresponding to the single equipment. Because the time is too short, the writer 
can hardly give a design flow of prognostic to EPS, but provides some 
suggestions to predict only. 
Item  Type Detection 
method 
Suggested  
methods 
Variable Frequency 
Generators, APU 
Generator, Ram Air Turbine 
generator 
Electro-
mechanical 
voltmeter, 
ammeter, CMS 
Hybrid methods 
of model-based 
and data-driven 
Generator Control Units, 
Bus Power Control Units, 
Static Inverter, Low Transfer 
Rectifier Units, High 
Transfer Rectifier Units , 
Frequency 
Modulators ,DC/DC  
converter, Electrical Loads 
Management Centres,  
Power 
Electronics 
current sensor, 
voltage senor, 
thermal sensor,
 
ANN (one of 
the data-driven 
prediction 
methods) 
Solid State Power 
Controllers, wires and 
cables , Generator Circuit 
Breakers, Bus Tie 
Breakers ,Circuit Breakers 
Power 
Electronics 
CMS model 
simulation 
(Model-based ) 
Batteries  Electrochemi
stry 
current sensor, 
voltage senor, 
thermal sensor,
Probability-
based 
Table 5-1 Prognostic methods to EPS  
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5.4 Summary and discussion 
In this chapter, different prognostic approaches were suggested to the 
components of EPS, after a qualitative analysis of failure symptoms of the 
electrical/electric systems.  
a. For the electromechanical product, such as generator, a model could be built 
based on its external characteristic, and adjusted according to the historical or 
experimental data.  
b. As for the power-electronic product, like GCU, it is difficult to model because 
of complicated internal circuit and limited output parameters. So the artificial 
neural network is a reasonable method to them. Although the SSPCs and GCBs 
belongs to power-electronic also, their internal circuits are simple and easily to 
model. 
c. Batteries are electrochemistry, and their remaining useful life could be 
predicted according to the historical data. 
The notion of prognostic techniques has been proposed and then developed for 
many years, however, the assessment of uncertainty of the remaining useful 
lifetime or time is still difficult for researchers. A hybrid method using model-
based and data-driven approaches to predict seems most accurate at present, 
but the cost is considerable either. Therefore, a trade-off between the cost and 
accuracy is considered, which needs the new technology or algorithms to be 
developed continuously.  
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6 CASE STUDY 
This chapter gives a case study based on the results of diagnostics and 
prognostics approaches in the last chapters. Firstly, the power converter is 
chose from EPS, Secondly, the failure modes of power converter are analysed 
in detail. Thirdly, DCBR techniques apply into the converter. Finally, a 
conclusion will be given. 
6.1 Introduction of Power Converter 
DC/DC power converter is used to provide emergency power to the vital loads 
in Flying Crane. The converter employs the boost circuit theory. Its voltage in 
input terminal is 28V DC supplied by two batteries, and output voltage is 270V 
DC to the loads. A simplified internal circuit of DC/DC converter is shown in 
Figure 6-1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-1 Internal circuit of DC/DC boost converter 
The main components among the converter are inductor L1, Diode D1, 
Capacitor C2, Power MOSFET K1 and PWM switch control module. The output 
wave form is mainly decided by the rated value of L1, capacity of C2, and 
switch frequency of K1. 
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The DC/DC power converter is chosen for study, mainly based on the following 
reason:  
From the safety analysis and fault tree analysis, it is found that DC/DC 
converter plays an important role in power supply to vital loads. If both of main 
generators and APU generator were out of work, the battery and RAT would 
switch to the electric network automatically. In this condition, the flight-critical 
loads, powered by 270V, would be supplied through the DC/DC converter. In 
case of the converter failure, a catastrophic scene would occur. Hence, 
diagnostics and prognostics to the converter are necessary. 
6.2 Failure modes of Power Converter 
To make a detail diagnosis to converter, a failure modes effect analysis was 
performed to the internal circuit. 
Item No. Failure high level effect 
1a short circuit the fuse between the battery and converter 
would blow  
Capacitor C1 
1b open circuit ripple waves increase and outputs degrade 
2a short circuit the fuse between the battery and converter 
would blow 
Inductor L1 
2b open circuit output turn into zero 
3a short circuit output turn into zero POWER  
MOSFET K1 3b open circuit output decrease from 270V to zero 
4a failure output decrease from 270V to zero PWM Switch  
Control Unit 
4b malfunction output voltage degrade 
Diode D1 5a short circuit power return to battery 
Item No. Failure high level effect 
Diode D1 5b open circuit no output 
6a short circuit the fuse between the battery and converter 
would blow 
Capacitor C2 
6b open circuit output equal to input, that is 28v 
7a short circuit ripple waves increase in output side, the 
power quality degrade 
R1/R2 
 
7b open circuit ripple waves increase in output side, the 
power quality degrade 
Table 6-1 FMEA of DC/DC converter 
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Comments: Table 6-1 shows the failure modes of internal circuit of converter, 
and consider briefly the external equipment which links to the converter, too. 
Actually, the real circuit of converter is more complicated than this. 
6.3 Diagnostic Process for Power Converter 
According to analysis of the converter circuit, probes are placed in a suitable 
position to obtain the operating data respectively. The writer adopts DCBR 
methods to diagnose the converter. The following diagnostic processes base on 
the hypothesis that all of the probes work correctly and the abnormal signals 
reflect the actual fault status exactly. 
a. Fault signal is detected by sensors (measure current and voltage) 
b. The signal is processed by filtering harmonic wave 
c. Translate the signal into sentence in particular style that could be 
identified by processor, called Diagnostic, Prognostic Processor Module 
(DPPM) 
For instance, Inductor L1 is open circuit and the current through L1 is zero, 
the sensor transfers the signal as “A IS B” style, which is (L1_CURRENT)-
IS-(ZERO)  
d. Perform similarity assessment by matching the new case with the old 
ones. 
Input Output Sim_value 
(L1_CURRENT)-IS-
(ZERO) 
(L1_CURRENT)-IS-
(ZERO) 
1*0.5+1*0.2+1*0.3=1
“Sim_value=1” means that the fault closely matches the case stored in the 
library. 
e. Confirm the failure case, and suggest corresponding solution by DPPM. 
f. Take actions and then receive the feed back from maintainers. 
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6.4 Prognostic approach  
DC/DC power converter belongs to power-electronic equipment, the incipient 
failure includes: Gate Oxide, hot, Electromagnetic Interference etc. Artificial 
Neural Network based on data-driven method could be used to predict the 
Remaining Useful Life of this kind of product. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-2 DPHM architecture of DC/DC converter 
Combined diagnostic and prognostic approach, DPHM architecture of DC/DC 
converter is given in Figure 6-2. 
6.5 Summary and discussion 
In this chapter, a detailed DPHM architecture was built up for power converter, 
as a result, it could qualitatively diagnose the fault or failure successfully 
according to the case-based approach. Besides, from the sensors’ data, the 
ANN methods could found the rule in converters so as to predict the RUL and 
detect the incipient fault in time. 
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In Figure 6-2, six pairs of probes are placed into the converter, and twelve 
signals are transformed to the processing module. It seems too many probes in 
a converter, which would degrade the reliability of monitors. With the statistical 
data updating, the components with high failure rate could be found, thereby, 
the probes setting could only focus on these components, so as to reduce the 
quantities of probes or sensors. Usage of smart sensors is another solution to 
improve the reliability of health management. The smart sensors have ability of 
auto-calibration and self-configuration, and they synthesise many new 
techniques such as wireless, opt-fibre etc. to increase the data validity [25] . 
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7 DPHM ARCHITECTURE OF EPS 
In this chapter, an entire architecture of diagnostics, prognostics and health 
management (DPHM) of EPS will be introduced. Then the working process of 
DPHM will be discussed as well. Finally, the writer discusses the relationship 
between DPHM of EPS and health management at aircraft level. 
7.1 DPHM Architecture of EPS 
The DPHM architecture of EPS is mainly based on the results of diagnosis and 
prognosis in Chapter4 and Chapter 5. Generally, the DPHM system is divided 
into two parts, on-board and off-board separately.  
7.1.1 On-board system 
The on-board system comprises series of sensors, probes, signal processing 
unit, Diagnosis, Prognosis Processing Module (DPPM), communication 
interface etc . Actually, some sensors or probes have been integrated into the 
design and manufacture of components, hence, these components provide 
monitoring interface to DPPM. Besides, some other components without placing 
sensors can provide status information to DPPM through the communication 
data bus. 
The on-board system could implement the following works: 
a. Monitor the EPS operating status 
b. Obtain the anomaly signals and process them 
c. Fault diagnosis and suggest solutions 
d. Failure record and display 
e. Information communication with aircraft level health management 
7.1.2 Off-board system 
The off-board system contains a ground support centre, which provides support 
and decision-making. 
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The off-board system can implement the following tasks: 
a. Information communication with aircraft level system 
b. Technical assistance for crucial problems 
c. Less critical problems solved post flight 
d. maintenance record management 
Figure 7-1 shows the DPHM of EPS schematic  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-1 Schematic of DPHM of electrical system 
7.2 Operating Process 
The operating flows of DPHM are as follows: 
a. When the EPS works, the sensors monitor the major components working 
status and collect abnormal signals; 
b. The signals would be pre-processed, that is, filtered to reduce noisy; 
c. After that, the feature of signal will be extracted and identified; 
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d. The DPPM judges the type of signals through algorithms, to decide if they 
are components fault/failure or warning of incipient failure; 
e. For the component fault/failure, the DPPM will diagnose the reason, then 
give a suggestion,  diagnosis process needs the assistance of ground base 
if necessary; on the other hand, for the warning of incipient failure, the 
DPPM will record the information; 
f. All of the actions will be sent to aircraft level health management, which 
could be checked and traced by maintainers. 
7.3 Relationship with aircraft level health management 
The above discussion is about the architecture of electrical system health 
management. Actually, airframe structure and other on-board systems like 
avionics, fuel system, flight control system and landing gear system etc also 
need health management. Accordingly, The DPHM of EPS is not an isolated 
one in the aircraft, and it constitutes a complete aircraft level health 
management together with other systems. We call this aircraft level health 
management system Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) or 
Integrated System Health Management (ISHM). 
The IVHM considers the aircraft as a whole; it combines all the system functions 
rather than be employed separately on individual subsystems, components and 
elements. [31] The electrical DPHM will communicate with IVHM by data bus, 
that is to say, receiving command, and sending results or suggestion. 
The end-users press for reducing maintenance costs and increasing reliability 
and safety of aircraft, all of which accelerate the integration and development of 
IVHM. The function of DPHM of EPS, as a result, will probably embed into 
IVHM as a LRM.  
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8 EVALUATION 
In this chapter, a qualitative assessment is performed to evaluate the diagnostic, 
prognostic and health management methods of EPS, from the aspects of 
system accuracy, cost and mass. 
8.1 System accuracy 
To diagnose the fault/ failure of a system correctly and prognose the impending 
fault/failure of a system accurately is one of the main goals of the DPHM system. 
Accordingly, a qualitative analysis of system accuracy is employed from the 
aspects of signal obtained, diagnostic engine and prognostic algorithms. 
8.1.1 Validity of signals 
It is considered firstly that the obtained signal could reflect the condition of the 
equipment being monitored as truly as possible. As the signals, in general, are 
captured by sensors and extracted by signal processor, forasmuch it is critical 
to ensure the sensitivity of sensors and good condition of processors.  
The sensors should keep high reliability to capture and transform monitoring 
data even in the extreme conditions, for instance, the environment of high 
temperature, low temperature, vibration and electromagnetic interference etc. 
These need the sensors to have the capability of self-health assessment.  [25] 
The smart sensors network, therefore, might be applied in the DPHM of EPS, 
which could ensure the failure rate of sensors much lower than the failure rate 
of objects being monitored. 
The signals will be processed to extract the fault feature after they are acquired 
by sensors. In this thesis, the signal processing technique is not mentioned. 
However, the writer would like to say that the signals could be filtered and 
amplified, to remove the harmonic wave and lower noise. After that, the signals 
are translated into specific patterns, which the DPPM could identify. 
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8.1.2 Accuracy of diagnostic engine 
The Dynamic Case-based Reasoning method is selected to diagnose the faults 
of the electrical power system. It matches the new problem to the old case in 
the case base, which is easy to find the fault reason and take actions for the 
system maintainers. For the common failure/fault problems, this method is 
correct and efficient. However, the condition becomes complex if a new problem 
has no similarity with all of the cases in the database. Besides, in the early time 
of system operating, there are a few cases in the base. The diagnoses need 
manual work frequently, which is less efficient. Since the case base grows 
permanently, less and less manual work is needed. Consequently, from the 
standpoint of long time works, the DCBR is able to diagnose problems of EPS 
accurately and correctly. 
8.1.3 Precision of prognosis algorithm 
For the prognosis of EPS, synthetic approaches are recommended for the 
different subsystems based on the components features. It is difficult to detect 
the impending failures and predict the remaining useful life of electronic 
products precisely till now. Although the writer suggests the prognosis approach 
corresponding to the features of components, it still could not be believed 
completely. When the prognosis actions appear, the maintainers or operators 
should analyse the system status with other tools or methods simultaneously, 
then make a proper decision. 
8.2 Cost Consideration 
The cost consideration is an important issue in evaluation of DPHM of EPS. 
There are many companies and research institutes studying the health 
management systems these days, but few of the techniques are really applied 
into the aircraft and most of the projects are still in the test stages. So it is 
difficult to estimate the expense in the DPHM of EPS. However, the cost of tests 
and experiments would be considerable before they come into use in the 
aircraft.  
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The cost lies in two parts: hardware and software design, the hardware includes 
sensors, digital processing modules and DPPMs. With the smart sensors 
appearance, the design of electrical components would consider embedding 
sensors techniques, which lower the cost of sensors. Meanwhile, the highly 
integrated aircraft level health management, such as IVHM system, manage 
health management of the whole aircraft. In this condition, the DPHM module of 
EPS would be a chip of IVHM system that means the cost will decrease. 
8.3 Mass of DPHM system 
As mentioned in above paragraph, the sensors could be integrated into the 
design of components, whilst DPHM module could assemble in the slots of 
IVHM. The signals could transfer by data bus. Consequently, the actual mass of 
DPHM system of EPS is lower than the weight be imagined. 

57 
9 CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, a set of generic diagnostic, prognostic and health management 
method was developed for the electrical power system in the aircraft. To design 
this DPHM architecture, a series of tasks were performed as follows: 
First of all, the EPS of Flying Crane was chosen as a research object. The 
writer employed analysis methods such as FHA, FMECA and FTA to distinguish 
all the failure conditions. From the FHA results, it showed that four functions 
loss, such as loss of 28V DC channels controllability operating independently, 
could lead to catastrophic event. Consequently, the components related to 
these functions were considered particularly. FMECA was conducted after the 
FHA analysis, most of the components in the EPS were analysed, except the 
wires, connectors etc and each failure mode of them was ranked according to 
severity level. Then the writer performed FTA to identify the root causes, which 
ensured no other failures were left. The results of FTA also showed that no 
single failure in EPS could lead to a catastrophic event. Based on the results 
from three analyses, the components monitored were selected, and their failure 
could be hazardous or catastrophic. Also, the related parameters and detection 
method were acquired. 
Secondly, the case-based reasoning approach was chosen to diagnose EPS 
failures after comparing four diagnostic methods in detail. The coding and 
adaptation needed to be considered when a CBR is used. The writer adopted 
DCBR, a variation of CBR, to the EPS, which retrieve case from data base 
quickly. The operating process could locate the failure reason correctly and 
quickly. As the case includes right solutions to the problem, the maintainers can 
take actions effectively to make the system resume working in a short time. 
Thirdly, the writer divided the components of EPS into three types: 
electromechanical, power-electronic and electrochemistry. The appropriate 
prognostic approaches were suggested to these components according to their 
different characteristics. Besides, the selection of prognostic approach was 
referred to compromises of accuracy and cost. 
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To demonstrate the diagnostic process, DC/DC power converter was analysed 
as a case study by using DCBR. It can diagnose the faults in the system 
reasonably. 
Finally, a synthetic architecture of diagnosis, prognosis and health management 
for EPS was built. The architecture showed a clear relationship between the 
monitored components, diagnosis module, aircraft level health management 
and ground-based maintenance. 
Above all, an integrated DPHM system was developed for the EPS based on 
the previous research. It could monitor the operating state of systems in real 
time, detect and process the abnormal signals, diagnose the fault/ failure 
reason correctly and quickly, then provide solutions to maintainers, give a 
warning in time when impending failures occur, and predict the remaining useful 
life of products. That the failures are detected and solved in a short time could 
reduce the delay rate of EPS significantly. The DPHM provide a method of 
maintenance on condition, and prediction before system failure, which reduce 
the expense of the periodical maintenance and unscheduled maintenance. The 
design achieved the objective in chapter 1 fully. 
The writer did not give detailed prognostic flow to the EPS due to limited time. 
This thesis did not include the diagnosis and prognosis of wire and connectors 
because of shortage of data in the preliminary design. The health management 
of loads was not considered either, for the loads are various and complicated. 
There are several problems which should be noticed:  
1. How to distinguish the validity of signals in case of sensors’ malfunction or 
loss of work? 
2. In the early time of system operating, there are a few cases in the base. It is 
probable that the failure occurred could not match the cases in the data base. 
So, the diagnoses need manual work frequently, which is less efficient.  
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3. Although a series of prognostic approaches has been suggested to EPS, to 
predict the remaining useful life of electric/ electronic components precisely is 
still difficult. Furthermore, a trade-off between the cost and accuracy is 
considered.  
A series of work are recommended to extend in the future:  
a. The DPHM of electrical power system should be researched further, and 
focus on every major component or subsystem, the wires, cables and 
connectors failure are concerned as well, in order to make the diagnostic work 
as correctly as possible.  
b. The prognostic approaches should be deployed fully. A combination method 
of modelling simulation and statistical data support should be tested on the EPS.  
 c. The health management of EPS is not isolated in the aircraft, therefore, the 
interface with IVHM should be considered. 
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A1 Fuel System Introduction 
A1.1 Introduction to Flying Crane 
The Flying Crane is a project developed by the Aviation Industry of China 
students during the academic year 2008-2009. Flying Crane is aimed primarily 
at China’s domestic air traffic market.  
Designed as a next generation airliner to replace the current Boeing 737 and 
Airbus 320 family, Flying Crane is a medium to short haul, single-aisle, 128-seat 
(two-class) jet liner with conventional configuration. [6]The design range of 
Flying Crane is 2,000 nautical miles. Flying Crane has a MTOW of 64,582 kg. 
The design cruise speed of Flying Crane is M 0.78 at the altitude of 39,000 ft, 
which equals to 230.15 m/s. In the preliminary phase, the Flying Crane is 
designed as an “All-Electric Aircraft”, whose standard is much higher than the 
conceptual one. Hence, all the systems of Flying Crane must accommodate 
with the characteristic of AEA. 
In the conceptual phase of Flying Crane, The design fuel capacity is 14,978kg. 
The fuel tank is made up to wing tanks and central tank. Among them, the 
central tank is optional, which is different from the conceptual one, for the 
reason that the data of the wing box is not accurate in that phase, and a 
mistake of calculating the capacity of the fuel tank had been executed. 
In the preliminary phase, the architecture of fuel system was designed 
according to the requirement from airworthiness management etc. The 
configuration of fuel tank was given in both 2D and 3D environment, especially 
the dry bay design which was a highlight in the GDP. 
A1.2 Description of the Task 
The writer was charge of two systems, Actuation system and Fuel system, 
which were totally different from his own major, electrical system. Therefore, the 
writer could not make the fuel system design 100% correct.  
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A1.3 Designing the baseline fuel system 
From the general task, the writer decided the task of fuel system design as 
follows. 
- Estimate power requirements of fuel system 
- System safety assessment of fuel system 
- Design of fuel tank; consider the dry bay design in case of rotor burst 
- System architecture of fuel system 
- Mass and size 
- System layout within flight vehicle airframe (CAD) 
- Airworthiness Compliance Matrix 
A1.4 Design Flow 
The fuel system design flow in preliminary phase included several major steps. 
The flow chart of fuel system is illustrated in Figure 1-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1 Design Flow of fuel system 
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A2 Requirement of Fuel System 
A2.1 Airworthiness Requirement 
There are three series of regulations available to the project, the CCAR-25, the 
FAR-25 and CS-25. As Flying Crane mainly faces to the domestic market in 
medium to short haul in China, the team made a decision that the airplane must 
comply with CCAR-25 in the all design phase. The fuel system must comply 
with CCAR-25 and other related safety regulation as well as other airframe 
systems. 
A2.2 Customer Requirement 
The designer needed to take in to account the potential requirement of Airliner 
companies that the needs of fuel capacity of the Flying Crane’s family for a 
prolong range. Therefore, it is necessary to plan an optional tank for the 
customer to choose. 
A2.3 Functional Requirement 
When the writer started to design a system to achieve the needed function, the 
first thing to do is to make a thorough study of the system so that no component 
or critical function is left out. [37]It is necessary to have an exhaustive approach 
to conceive the fuel system; although it can be seen as a compilation of 
different entities, some of them could in fact be complementary and the analysis 
that has to precede the beginning of the design should enable optimizing the 
system, thus saving weight and possibly development, production and operating 
costs. 
The fuel system analysis in the first stages of the project leads to the 
identification of the following functions: 
A primary function: To provide a reliable supply of fuel to engines. These 
conditions must be met even under the most extreme circumstances defined by 
the flight envelope.  
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Another function is to provide the auxiliary power unit with fuel whenever it is 
required.  
A2.3.1 Function of Fuel system deployment 
The first functions described in the previous paragraph are major functions; they 
suppose peripheral functions: 
A. storage function: fuel is stored in the aircraft using the fuel tanks during the 
flight mission. B. refuel/defuel function: the fuel will have to be pumped directly 
into the tanks of aircraft during the grounded refueling operations. A defuel 
system will be needed to empty the fuel tank. C. collector function: during the 
flight, fuel has to be transferred into collector tanks. D. transfer function: given 
the large quantities of fuel that are needed for the long range civil transport and 
the tanker version, the progressive consumption of fuel will have an influence 
on the position of the CG of the aircraft. E. measurement function: In the flight 
mission, the crew needs to know the amount of fuel as precisely as possible 
when it is available. f. Venting/Inerting function: throughout the flights, the fuel 
tanks are being filled and emptied. G. pressurizing function: using an on-board 
inert gas generation system can suppose two uses. H. fuel dumping function: 
the CCAR requirements impose performances on the aircraft, particularly in the 
case of engine failure; it must be required to maintain climbing capabilities as 
CCAR 25.119 and 25.121(d).  
As the previous chapter said, the general fuel system function considers all 
kinds of cases so as to make no sub-functions left. However, it is unnecessary 
to choose the entire functional requirement for the project, after the analysis of 
the characteristics of Flying Crane and the conceptual design specification.[6] 
For instance, the landing gear system has extra 10% design redundancy which 
means no fuel jettison in flight during any emergent landing, which has been 
discussed with landing gear structure designer. 
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A2.3.2 Functional Hazardous Assessment of Fuel System 
It is essential to precede Functional Hazardous Assessment (FHA) of systems 
in the design phase. In CCAR 25.1309 and the advisory circular, it is specified 
in detailed about the system failure conditions.  
Following the detail guideline in SAE ARP 4754 and CCAR 25.1309, the writer 
performed the FHA of fuel systems based on the functions in the former chapter.  
A2.3.3 Physical and Installation Requirement 
In the preliminary design phase, the major concern of physical and installation 
requirement of fuel system is the fuel tank deployment and installation of the 
main components, for instance, the pump, the valve etc. So, it needs to 
cooperative with wing designer about the wing box where the fuel holds in the 
early stage.  
A2.3.4 Maintenance and Reliability Requirement 
Maintenance and reliability are critical issues for the customer, and they should 
be considered in the early stage. To achieve them, the designer needs to take 
into account the following items, 
The simplicity design, 
The redundancy design, 
The operating environment design, 
The human-engineering design, 
The lighting protection design (CCAR 25.1316), 
The test ability design, 
The derating design and 
The thermal design 
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For the fuel system, it should be satisfied this requirement. 
A2.3.5 Interface requirement 
Interface requirement is a considered issue when the writer designed the fuel 
system and thought about the relationship between the systems. In the early 
stage of the preliminary design phase, the system boundary and the 
Input/Output needed to be discussed among the whole group included system 
designers and structured designers. With the engineering experience in civil jet 
design, the whole group referred to the ATA 100 to make it clear the boundary 
between all the systems. The designer took into account the following situations. 
What is the power supply for fuel system? 
Which kind of system needs the fuel providing? 
Which kind of data needs to be displayed? 
After the writer considered the above questions, the relation chart was drawn as 
follows.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1 the simply relationship between fuel system and others 
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A3 Fuel Tank Design 
The fuel tanks store the fuel which provides to the engines, and the fuel in the 
wing tank could reduce the loads on the wing. In this phase, the writer needs to 
design the fuel tank included the shape of tank (consider the rotor burst effects), 
the volume of the tank individual and totally and the location of the tank, as well 
as the CG position. 
In the former specification of Flying Crane, the roughly configuration of fuel tank 
was provided as well as the design point of fuel capacity. The fuel tank was 
composed of five tanks, the right inboard tank, the right outboard tank, the left 
inboard tank, the left outboard tank and the central tank. 
The design point of fuel capacity is 14,978kg, and the maximum mass of fuel is 
17,560kg. Therefore, the writer should base on this provided data to design the 
fuel tank, except for the critical issue to mend it. 
The fuel tank design should be compliant with CCAR 25.963 and AMC 20.128, 
which is the first consideration item on airworthiness regulation.  
A3.1 The volume of tanks 
The Flying Crane needs to be able to accommodate enough fuel to fulfil its 
mission safely. 14,978kg is needed according to the performance team. 
Concerning the tanker version, the higher the mass of fuel that it can store, the 
better it would be in terms of off-load capabilities during operations. 
Concerning the volume of the tanks themselves, it is relatively difficult to 
estimate precisely from the CAD models. However space must be left for the 
structure of the wing, as well as for the different components of the fuel system: 
pipes, pumps and sealant mainly. Sufficient expansion space must also be left 
since fuel can be submitted to different pressures and temperatures during the 
flight. As a result, it is about 8 % of the given CAD model volume that will have 
to be withdrawn to obtain the truly available volume of fuel. In order to have 
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some flexibility in the CG position when the fuel load is to its maximum, it can 
be considered that a margin of 10% is required. 
Some rapid calculations for the Flying Crane: 
Initial required mass of fuel: 14,978 kg. 
Equivalent volume in the lower value of the density at 800 kg/m3 
314978 18.72
800
m=
 
Equation 3-1: Minimum volume required in the tanks 
This volume should represent 90% of the CAD volume; therefore the CAD 
volume should be: 
318.72 20.8
0.9
m=
 
Equation 3-2: Minimum volume required on the CAD model 
Finding the volume was subject to the dimensions that were chosen for the wing 
box. Issues arose concerning the position, size and retraction mechanism of the 
main landing gear. This could have had an impact on the position of the rear 
spar thereby affecting the volume of the wing box.  
After several discussions and cooperative work with wing designer and landing 
gear designer, the front and rear spars’ positions settled to respectively 15% 
and 65% of the chord. 
Moreover, due to the threat posed by the lightning strikes, fuel must not be 
located on the most outer part of the wings, hence, the outer boundaries located 
at 16.14 m from the centreline. With a wingspan of 33.48m, that would give a 
1.2 m margin for the Flying crane in case of lightning strikes.  
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A3.1.1 A big issue about volume calculation in 3D environment 
When the writer made the decision of the front and rear spars’ positions, a 
problem rose. According to Mr Xue’s GDP report of fuel tank configuration in 
last year, [39] the volume calculations are follows: 
34.48inboardV m=  
33.84outboardV m=  
36.77centralV m=  
3( ) 2 23.41total inboard outboard centralV V V V m= + × + =  
Equation 3-3: The volume on the report in last year 
While the volume in the new 3D model are follows: 
3( ) 2 23.16inboard outboardV V V m= + × =  
Equation 3-4: The volume calculation of fuel system 
It means that only the volume of wing tank inboard and outboard in new model 
is satisfied with the design point 20.38m3. When the writer and wing designer 
checked again, they found that the wing shape used in last year is totally wrong. 
Therefore, the volume derived from the wing box in last year is incorrect as well. 
However, it is really good news for fuel system reliability and the safety of Flying 
Crane. 
After the supervisor, Prof. J. Fielding, checked the design and communicate 
with designers, the group made a decision that the central tank is set as a 
optional tank for stretch type, whilst the base line fuel systems includes four 
tanks, the right inboard tank, the right outboard tank, the left inboard tank and 
the left outboard tank. 
Consequently, the total volume of fuel tank is 23.16m3(without considering the 
rotor burst influence) 
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A3.2 The configuration of tanks 
As the previous said, the total volume has been decided, and then the next step 
is to confirm the boundary of tank individually. 
A3.2.1 The boundary of inboard tank and outer tank 
The wing tank starts at No.1 rib and ends at No.19 rib in each side of the wing, 
and the volume is 23.16 m³ in together, thereby the task is to decide the 
boundary between the inboard tank and outer tank.  
The GDP report of last year about fuel tank layout gives a reason to decide the 
wing tank boundary; he said that to shorten the time of refuelling, it is better to 
make the capacity of two tanks close to insure the refuelling time close. From 
the reality consideration, the refuelling gap and receptacle on the right wing of 
the aircraft, and it is no relation with the similar time for refuelling. Hence, it is 
not a proof to support the boundary dividing. 
It is difficult to find some proof or solution to determine the boundary of them, so 
the writer referred to some similar aircraft, for instance, A320 family, Global 
express etc. 
After discussed with supervisor, the writer decided the boundary based on two 
proofs. First, for a better stress of structure considering all the components and 
loads in the wing, such as the engine pylon, the position of boundary sets to the 
inflexion of the wing. Second, as Michael Niu said. [33] 
Considering the proofs above, the boundary sets at No.8 rib, that is to say, the 
inboard tank occupies from No.1 rib to No.8 rib, the outer tank occupies from 
No.8 rib to No.19 rib. The volume of inboard tank and outer tank is 8.212 m³and 
3.368 m³in each side respectively. 
A3.2.2 The boundary of surge tank 
The surge tank occupies at least 2 percent of totally volume. 
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The surge tank starts at No.19 rib and ends at No.22rib in each side of the wing 
and the volume is 0.408 m³ for each side. Therefore, the ratio=
0.408 2 3.52%
23.16
× =
, 
which is suitable for the requirement. 
A3.2.3 The layout of wing tank 
Following the boundary instruction in previous paragraph, the layout of wing 
tank illustrated as follows, (only shows the ring wing) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1 the fuel tank layout in right wing [34] 
A3.3 Dry Bay Design 
The dry bay design is a brand new task, which was distributed to safety 
designer and fuel tank designer by Prof. J. Fielding. The aim of the design is to 
minimize hazards caused by uncontained turbine engine and auxiliary power 
unit rotor failure. 
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Because there was neither reference nor thesis involved the process of dry bay 
design, the only proof is AMC 20-128A. It is really a challenging work to design 
the dry bays for Flying Crane. After a few weeks learning and discussing about 
the drawing, the designer found a solution finally. 
With the wing designer’s help, the drawing was managed to finish in CATIA 
sketch. 
Some key point of consideration as follows, 
The spread angle of rotor debris is 15 degrees for the composite material wing. 
Calculating the first and the last rotor debris spreading trace decides the 
envelope of all the area of rotor burst influence. 
Sweep angle from 15 degree to 0 degree to determine the envelope of 
penetrating track. 
Based on the above consideration, the writer minimized the size of dry bay and 
it can be seen in Figure 3-4.[17]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2 Dry bay area in the wing 
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A4 Architecture of fuel system 
Architecture of fuel system is one of the major tasks in the preliminary design 
phase, and it is the basis of case study. From the design flow chart in chapter 
1, it is known that the design process is iterative; therefore, the architecture of 
system needs to keep update with proceeding in the whole design process. 
A4.1 Architecture in first round 
When the writer began to design the architecture of fuel system, the first thing 
was to ascertain the start point of it, that is to say the input of architecture. 
From the chapter 2, the functions of fuel system was provided, accordingly, 
the sub-system and/or components in the architecture should realize these 
functions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1 sub-system and major components of fuel system 
A4.2 Fault tree analysis of fuel system 
From the schematic of architecture in first round, the writer could do the fault 
tree analysis (FTA) of fuel system so as to calculate the redundancy of major 
components such as, boost pumps, transfer valves etc. One sample of the 
FTA report illustrated as follows. 
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A5 Case study-Engine feed sub-system 
In the preliminary phase, the writer gave a case study of engine feed 
subsystem, providing the boost pump product specification; engine feed pipe 
installation in 3D environment. 
A5.1 Power calculated of boost pump 
The architecture of engine feed system was introduced in Chapter 4, and the 
major components of this system are boost pumps, APU pumps, transfer 
valves, engine feed shut-off valves, APU feed shut-off valves, cross feed shut-
off valve, scavenge injector pumps and sensors. In the preliminary phase, it is 
really difficult to calculate the power requirement and mass of each 
component, besides, the writer never study the fuel system before the GDP 
work started.  Therefore, the writer gave the power estimation of boost pump 
as a case study.  
The methodology of power estimation is as follows. First, the mechanical 
power of pump equal to the power of proving fuel flow rate with pressure in 
the outlet of pump. Second, the writer supposed that the fuel flow rate equal 
to the fuel consumption rate. Besides, as the fuel feed pressure varied from 
10-15 psi, [23]10 psi (68.95KPa) was selected in this study. 
The fuel consumption rate derived from performance and flight quality report 
by Mr.Jia, and the rate in every flight phase could be seen in the table 5-1. 
Phase Time(s) Quantity of Fuel  
consumption(Kg) 
Consumptio
n Rate(Kg/S) 
Fluid 
(L/min) 
Take-off + Clime 657 851 1.295 97.15 
Cruise 12770 8875 0.695 52.12 
Descent 1199 614 0.512 38.41 
Table 5-1 Quantity of fuel consumption in the flight 
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In the worst-case scenario, one side of the boost pump is out of order in the 
take-off phase; the pump remaining provides fuel to two engines. So the peak 
power of the boost pump could be calculated, considering the efficiency of 
power transfer (η) is 0.5. 
_ Pr 68.95 97.15 / 6000 1.116mech pumpP Flowrate essure Kw= × = × =  
_ _ /elec pump mech pumpP P wη= =1.116 / 0.5 = 2.23Κ  
Equation 5-1 Calculate power of boost pump 
According to the calculated result, the writer found the similar product on the 
shelf. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1 Technical characteristic of the booster pump, EATON 
Aerospace [21; 21] 
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This pump from EATON Aerospace is used in A320 family, and Flying Crane 
has a similar capacity with A320 family, which also validated the results of 
estimate is reasonable. 
A5.2 Lay out in CAD 
The writer made simply lay out of engine feed in CATIA environment, showing 
the installation of boost pumps, cross feed shutoff valve, transfer valve and 
pipes. When the major components were installed in the fuel tank model, the 
rotor burst influence must be considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-2 Engine feed lay out in CTAIA model 
 
 
 
 
 82 
A6 General consideration of fuel system 
In the preliminary phase, the mass, CG control is important consideration to the 
whole aircraft; meanwhile, the power consumption needs to provide to electrical 
power system for power capacity.  
A6.1 Mass, CG estimation 
The mass of fuel system is composed of fuel mass and mass of the sub-system 
and major components, pipe etc. 
A6.1.1 Mass, CG of fuel 
The design point of the fuel capacity is 14,978kg in specification book, and it 
needs to distribute the wing tanks to manage the CG position. Besides, the 
maximum mass of fuel should design to exceed mass of the design point. 
For the aviation fuel, the density is between 775 and 840 kg per cubic metre. A 
value of 800 kg per cubic metre will be used for the calculations relative to the 
sizing of the fuel system. Therefore, the mass of fuel in each tank could be 
calculated. The table 5-1 shows the maximum capacity of baseline fuel tank. 
 
Inner Wing 
Tank 
Outer Wing 
Tank Total 
Design Volume（m³） 7.39×2 3.03×2 20.844 
Mass（Kg） 5,912.6×2 2,424.9×2 16,675.2 
Table 6-1 mass distribution of fuel 
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Inner Wing 
Tank (right) 
Outer Wing
Tank (right)
Inner Wing
Tank (left)
Outer Wing 
Tank (left) Total 
X（mm） 16314.718 18737.167 16314.718 18737.167 
 
17019.353
Y（mm） 4159.277 10327.986 -4159.277 -10327.986 0 
Z（mm） -821.325 -170.227 -821.325 -170.227 -631.955
Table 6-1 CG position of each fuel tank 
A6.1.2 Mass estimate of fuel components 
The specification book in last year gave a budget of 987 kg for the fuel system 
components and pipes in baseline aircraft. The final mass clearly does not 
match with the budget. First, in a baseline fuel system, the central tank was 
optional, that is to say, there were few pumps and pipes installed in it. 
Accordingly, that proportion of components need not include in the total mass. 
Much of the weight comes from the sealing of the tanks; there are different 
existing technologies, and the mass of sealant can be expected to be between 
50 and 80 pounds per 1000 gallons. [8] An optimistic value of 60 was chosen 
for the system.  
The other main contributor to the weight is the OBIGGS. This system is not 
compulsory and possibly not taken into account in the mass budget of the 
specification book. Its mass is in accordance with other OBIGGS currently being 
studied and developed but the masses of smaller components are not accurate 
enough and can only be thought of as provisional allowances to develop a 
component specific to this OBIGGS. 
A6.1.3 Fuel consumption curve and fuel management 
The CG of fuel consumption is complicated because the fuel left depends on 
the aircraft’s angle of inclinations, and accelerations in three dimensions. 
Nevertheless, a first approximation can be calculated using CAD model. The 
 84 
results were obtained by splitting the tanks’ volumes into successively smaller 
volumes with planes parallel to ground level. CATIA can then compute the 
centre of gravity of a homogeneous volume. 
In addition to the attitude of the aircraft, the tanks can also deform with the wing: 
that was not taken into account in these calculations. The fact that the lift will 
bend the wing upwards will make fuel flow towards the centreline. On the 
ground, the mass of the fuel in the tanks will locally decrease the dihedral angle 
and move the fuel outwards. 
A6.2 Power requirement of fuel system 
In this phase, the power consumption of fuel system needs to provide to the 
electrical system designer, for which the power capacity of Flying Crane could 
be estimated.  
The components needed power include the pumps, the valves, the sensors, 
and electronic control units etc. In this stage, the writer could not do some study 
deeply in it, so most of power estimation comes from the reference book and 
product specification from website. However, the power type could be decided 
depending on the provided data. For the fuel boost pumps and valves, 115vAC 
power is needed; while28 v DC power could activate the APU boost pump and 
electronic control unit. 
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A7 Safety, Maintainability, Reliability 
A7.1 Safety of fuel system 
Safety is important issue in the design process, and there are three kinds of 
catastrophic conditions due to the system failure .(the FHA report of fuel system) 
in this stage, the writer thought of two critical items, the dry bay design in case 
of rotor burst and on board inerting gas generation system related to fuel tank 
safety. 
The dry bay design was stated in Chapter 3, and according to supervisor’s 
advice, the engine pylon set half metre than the previous one, which lead the 
dry bay removal from the wing tank totally. 
‘The centre wing fuel tank is categorised as hazardous; requiring fuel tank 
inerting due to the temperatures encountered and the proximity to external heat 
sources of which the air conditioning units represent a significant heat 
source. ’[23]’Left and right wing tanks are usually considered to be 
nonhazardous, primarily as the fuel contained within is much cooler and the fuel 
does not suffer from the proximity of hot aircraft components.’[23] In the 
baseline fuel tank, there are only wing tank in Flying Crane that means the 
OBIGGS could be an optional systems. 
A7.2 Maintainability and Reliability 
Maintainability was a major issue in the design of the fuel system. In the engine 
feed subsystem installation, the writer had considered about it. 
The reliability target for the fuel system was 99.85%. [22] The subsystems 
featured in the fuel system were designed to provide enough reliability to meet 
this target. The calculation of the total reliability of the system is a function of the 
number of components, their dependency, and the fact that they have 
redundancies or not. The team in charge of computing the reliability of the 
system concluded that it reached a value of 99.88%. 
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A8 Discussion 
A8.1 Fuel pump of HVDC powered 
The fuel boost pump used 115 AC power to drive, which was conservative 
technology compared to 270V DC powered. The reason lies to the safety of fuel 
tank according to AC 25.981.1C.  When the writer designed the fuel tank and 
components in it, the electrical arc and electrical spark is an important issue of 
fuel tank safety. The HVDC pump has its advantage in smaller size and less 
weight; however, the pump drove by 270v DC has much potential hazard than 
the AC pumps. Although the cable connected to the pump is much lighter and 
more flexible than the AC one, the protection must be considered seriously in 
case of wire damaged and aging.  
Consequently, the usage of HVDC fuel pump is reasonable unless the 
technology is matured and has the same level in safety compared to AC pump. 
A8.2 Dry bay design 
Another issue about fuel tank safety is the influence in case of rotor burst. 
Although the probability of rotor burst is extremely improbable, the effect of 
debris penetrating fuel tank or airframe is nearly catastrophic. Therefore, the dry 
bay design is necessary unless the engine location moving too forward to 
remove it. There two cases are considering: the large volume of dry bay, the 
less fuel remains, which is not economic; that the moving forward of engine 
derates the whole performance of aircraft. So it is trade off in fuel tank design.   
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A9 Actuation System Introduction 
A9.1 Introduction of actuation system 
The general introduction of Flying Crane was described in Chapter 1, and the 
characteristic of this aircraft is all electric which is different from the specification 
given by AVIC students in last year. The all-electric aircraft has only one kind of 
second power- electric power, with hydraulic power and pneumatic power 
removed, which means that the role of providing power to flight control by 
hydraulic was replaced by electric power. Consequently, the actuator design 
should meet the new power requirement. 
In the next chapters, the writer introduced the actuator design for the primary 
flight control system, secondary flight control system, landing gear system and 
so on. 
A9.2 Description of task 
- Choose the suitable type of actuator for control organism 
- Estimate power requirements of actuation system 
- Schematic block diagrams of actuation system 
- System safety assessment of actuation system 
- System architecture of actuation system 
- Mass and size 
- System layout within flight vehicle airframe (CAD) 
- Check interfaces with structure and other systems (CAD) 
- Airworthiness Compliance Matrix 
A9.3 Compare Hydraulic Powered Actuation system and 
Electric Powered Actuation system 
Hydraulic actuation as traditional powered has number of advantages like it has 
high output force capability, effective positioning of actuator corresponding to 
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command signal. One of the advantages is that it has high accuracy even in 
very high force. [3] 
However, on the other hand, hydraulic system has many drawbacks, either. 
First, hydraulic needs sets of accessory gear box of engine, central reservoir for 
store fluid, and many kinds of pipes and valves, which occupy considerable 
weight of aircraft. Second, hydraulic systems keep high pressure throughout the 
flight, resulting in great power loss. Third, fluid leakage and fire hazardous are 
potential threaten to the whole aircraft. Finally, maintenance hydraulic 
components cost considerable labour-intensive. 
Electrical actuation uses electric power for actuation and removes the 
accessory gear box, central reservoir and all the pipes, reducing a great deal of 
mass. Another aspect, actuators powered by electric could active on command, 
which saves much energy. Finally, the controlling and powered wires are 
flexible so that they are easily routed in manufacturing, and maintenance 
becomes easy, either. 
A9.4 Review of existing electrical actuator technologies 
A9.4.1 FBW actuators  
The actuators used with the FBW systems are hydraulically powered and 
electrically controlled by Flight Control Computer.  
A9.4.2 IAP, EHA and EBHA  
a) IAP 
Integrated Actuator Package is similar to the conventional linear actuator, which 
operations on demand, summing and feedback, and linkage. The actuator 
power is provided by a Constant Speed Constant Frequency (CSCF) electrical 
motor driving a variable displacement hydraulic pump.  
b) EHA  
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Electro-Hydrostatic Actuator is an actuator which is commanded and also 
powered by electrical systems. A variable speed electric motor is used to drive 
a hydraulic pump integrated into a hydraulic circuit with components like 
reservoirs and accumulators as in a typical hydraulic circuit but in smaller space.  
The suppression of hydraulic components through the entire aircraft minimizes 
risks of leakages and consequently, improves the reliability of EHA in 
comparison with Hydraulic actuators.  
c) EBHA  
Since most of the aircraft still requires hydraulic power for heavy loads such as 
landing gears etc, it was considered advantageous to use this source of power 
combined with electric power. This led to the design of a hybrid configuration 
incorporating hydraulic servo valve with EHA called Electrical Back-Up 
Hydraulic Actuator (EBHA). The EBHA normally works with the available 
hydraulic system and switches to electric powered EHA whenever hydraulic 
system is not available.  
A9.4.3 Electromechanical Actuator (EMA)  
The EMA “replaces the electrical signalling and power actuation of the electro-
hydraulic actuator with an electric motor and gearbox assembly applying the 
motive force to move the ram. EMAs have been used on aircraft for many years 
for such uses as trim and door actuation; however the power, motive force and 
response times have been less than that required for flight control actuation. A 
major concern regarding the EMA is the Flight Control Systems consideration of 
the actuator jamming case and this has negated their use in primary flight 
controls on conventional aircraft. “[23] 
A9.4.4 Comparisons of Actuation Technologies 
The general comparisons are presented in table 9-1. 
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Considerations FBW IAP EHA EBHA EMA 
Power  Centralised 
hydraulic 
High 
power 
electric 
High 
power 
electric 
Centralised 
hydraulic/ 
High power 
electric 
High 
power 
electric 
Control Low power  
electric 
Low 
power  
electric 
Low/High 
power 
electric 
Low/High 
power 
electric 
Low/High 
power 
electric 
Efficiency normal  normal high normal normal 
Complexity normal normal normal very 
complex 
very 
complex 
Thermal low high high normal high 
Environmental Fluid leak 
and 
disposal 
Fluid 
leak and 
disposal 
Fluid leak 
and 
disposal 
Fluid leak 
and 
disposal 
Negligible
actuator size small small slightly 
bigger 
big moderate
Jamming No No No No Yes 
Table 9-1 comparison among different types of actuators 
The advantages and disadvantages are clearly shown in this table, and towards 
the more-electric aircraft even all-electric aircraft, the central-hydraulic power 
has been removed, which means the FBW are not suitable for Flying Crane. 
Accordingly, the writer used the electrical powered actuator which detailed 
choosing was introduced in the Chapter 11. 
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A10 Requirement of Actuation system 
A10.1 Airworthiness Requirement 
Flying Crane mainly faces to the domestic market in medium to short haul in 
China, so the aeroplane must compliance with CCAR-25 in the all design 
phase. The actuation system must compliance with CCAR-25 and other 
related safety regulation as well as other airframe systems. 
A10.2 Functional Requirement 
The first step of actuation system is to decide the scope and boundaries with 
other systems, because the actuation system has close relation with them. 
The writer discussed with flight control system designer about the boundary 
and then decided that the control command and power function belongs to the 
flight control system, while the actuation system performs the function of 
controlling the surface. 
The actuator needs to drive the active component to perform normal flight 
function, and they are follows, 
Primary flight control surfaces: 
Ailerons 
Elevators 
Rudders 
Secondary flight control surfaces: 
Slats 
Flaps 
Spoilers 
Tail horizontal stabilizer 
Nose landing gear steering 
Landing gears retraction 
Landing gears break 
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Thrust reversal 
Cargo doors 
Functional Hazardous Assessment was given according to the different 
control parts playing roles in the whole aircraft. 
A10.3 Maintenance and reliability Requirement 
Maintenance and reliability are critical issues for the customer, and they 
should be considered in the early stage. To achieve them, the designer needs 
to take into account the following items, 
The simplicity design, 
The redundancy design, 
The operating environment design, 
The human-engineering design, 
The lighting protection design (CCAR 25.1316), 
The test ability design, 
The derating design and 
The thermal design.
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A11 Actuation architecture 
The Actuation architecture on A340 was conventional centrally powered 
hydraulic channels, whist the one in A380 was more advanced with removing 
one hydraulic channel and increasing two electric channels. Towards the 
Flying Crane, an all electric aircraft serving in 2020s, these two kinds of 
architecture seem not suitable. Accordingly, all actuators powered by wire 
were needed, a 3E type was chosen for the Flying Crane. 
The structure designers have worked out the control surfaces of Flying Crane 
as follows. 
 Control surfaces Number of 
surfaces  
Title 
Elevators 2 Left and right elevator 
Ailerons 2 Left and right aileron 
Rudder 1 one piece of rudder 
Slats 10 Left and right, inboard, middle, 
outboard slats  
Flaps 4 Left and right, inboard, outboard flaps
Spoilers 12 Left and right, inboard, middle, 
outboard spoilers 
Tail 
plane(Horizontal 
 Stabilizer) 
1 Tail plane 
Table 11-1 Control surface of Flying Crane 
Similar to three kinds of hydraulic power, blue, green and yellow in A340, the 
Flying Crane used three channels of electric power to ensure the redundancy. 
The writer communicated with electrical power distribution designer about the 
type of power distribution. After several times hesitated and turn over, the 
power supplied to actuators was decided, and all the actuators were powered 
by Electrical Loads Management Centre (ELMC) 4, 5, 6 separately, and they 
were corresponding to the blue, the green and the yellow one. The 
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relationship between the actuators and power distributions could be seen in 
Figure10-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11-1 Actuator location and power distribution 
Control 
parts 
Numbers 
of  
Actuator 
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3
2
1
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Flaps 8 Left and right 
inboard No.1, 
outboard No.1
Right inboard 
No.2,outboard 
No.2 
Left inboard 
No.2,outboard 
No.2 
Spoilers 12 Left and right 
No.3, No.4 
Left and right 
No.1, No.6 
Left and right 
No.2, No.5 
Tail plane 
(Horizontal 
 Stabilizer) 
1 Tail plane   
Nose Wheel 
steering 
1    
Landing 
gear 
retraction 
2    
Landing 
gear break 
24    
Table 11-2 Actuator powered distribution of Flying Crane 
A11.1 Fault Tree Analysis for actuation system 
When the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was performed for the actuation system, 
it was difficult for analysis, because the actuation system in this stage has 
close relation with flight control system and overlaps each other, which means 
repeated work would be done for the analysis. The writer discussed with Mr. 
Lv, flight control system designers, and decided to perform the FTA of flight 
control system and Actuation system together [30]. 
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A12 Selection and Initial Sizing actuator on Flying 
Crane 
A12.1 Selection of EHA  
The principle of EHA was already discussed in Chapter 9; EHAs were 
employed for Primary Flight Control system and Landing Gear system control 
and Nose Wheel Steering of Flying Crane. The details of EHA are as given 
bellow: 
A12.1.1 Operating system pressure 
As mentioned before, the EHAs use a local hydraulic loop, and the size of the 
actuator mainly depends on the operating pressure of system. The higher 
pressure is operating, the miner diameter of actuator gets. 
Generally, the operating hydraulic pressure is 3000 psi in civil aircraft, while in 
the advanced aircraft, for instance, A380 and Boeing 787, a 5000 psi system 
is used. In the conceptual specification of Flying Crane, it is 5000 psi in 
hydraulic system. The application of higher pressure has absolutely 
advantage-reduces the size as well as weight of actuator. However, the 
higher pressure has some disadvantage, such as thicker wall, more server 
condition for sealing rings, more chances of leakage etc. 
Compared the advantage with drawbacks, the writer chose 5000 psi as 
operating pressure, for the reason that, the size and weight of actuator is 
more important especially in limited space, and the technology of higher 
pressure is developing to eliminate the disadvantage, including leakage. 
A12.1.2 Type of EHA 
a. Double acting Linear Actuator[36] 
Double-acting linear actuator is the most commonly used for all types of 
applications and it includes two fluid chambers formed due to piston.  The rod 
could retract and extend on either side of piston through hydraulic pressure. 
Effective working area of the rod side of the piston is less than that of the 
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other side, therefore, the double-acting cylinders retract faster than they 
extend, and exert less force on the retraction stroke. 
b. Rotary Vane Actuator (EHA) 
Rotary vane actuator comprises a shaft with vanes and cylinder with opposite 
type of vanes on internal diameter. The hydraulic pressure driven by a motor 
can act in either direction of vanes for rotation. Vanes experience the 
differential pressure and withstand it in order to maintain the integrity of the 
actuator.[20]  
In most cases of actuation on Flying Crane the number of vanes was two, 
because multiple vanes could magnify the mechanical torque as compared to 
a single vane actuator for the same input in hydraulic pressures. 
The end-casing is attachment between the cylinder of actuator and the hinge 
of aircraft. They also help in completely enclosing the cylinder thereby 
preventing any leakages. The flange helps in transferring the torque loads to 
the control surface. 
The rotary actuator controls the surfaces of aileron, rudder and elevator. 
A12.1.3 Selection of EMA 
As described in previous section, the EMAs were employed in secondary 
flight control system. There are two kinds of EMA used in Flying Crane, and 
they are Lead Screw Actuator and Planetary Roller Screw Linear Actuator. 
Now days, in most of the EMA’s planetary roller screw is used because of its 
ability to withstand at high speed and acceleration and also having capacity to 
handle heavy load for a long time.[20]  
A12.1.4 A case study of sizing actuator 
All of the actuators used in Flying Crane need to be sizing, and the methods 
are different for various kinds of actuator. In this section, the writer gave a 
case study of sizing the main landing gear actuator.  
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The actuator employed in main landing gear is linear EHA. In fact, it is really 
difficult to calculate the size, the writer referred to the supervisor to find an 
acceptable solution. 
The actuator is designed by considering the followings: 
The hydraulic force of actuator is capable to withstand the proof actuation 
load. 
The cylinder wall thickness can meet the burst pressure requirement which is 
2.5times nominal pressure.[3]  
All other components are capable to handle ultimate load without any fracture 
failure and also return to original working conditions after the load has been 
removed. 
Some information of landing gear is shown on the table12-1.  
Actuator stroke 167.000 mm 
Pressure 5000 psi 
Time taken 4.000 s 
Stall Load 136.923 KN 
Arm 130.000 mm 
Moment 17.800 KNm 
Table 12-1 Some load data of Main Landing Gear 
1. Overall Actuator Length: 
0.5actL Stroke Fitting Sealing Stroke= + + + [32] 
Fitting is the cylinder length of holding the rod, and sealing is the overlap 
and redundancy between rod and cylinder. Considering the fitting is 0.18m, 
and the sealing is 0.01m, 0.167 0.18 0.01 0.167 0.5 0.44actL m= + + + × =  
 99 
 
2. Euler Buckling Load  
2
2load
act
EIP
L
π= , critP is stall load, and consider 
E=200,000 MN/㎡,  so, 
2
8 4
2 1.347 10
load actP LI m
Eπ
−= = ×  
3. Actuator Rod diameter 
4
4
rodrI π= ,  so 
1
44 0.0111rod
Ir mπ
⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
 
4. Effective Piston Area ( )max cyl rod loadP A A P− = , as shown in table maxP =5000psi, 
so 
      ( ) 20.0052987cyl rodA A m− = ( cylA is the inner cross area of cylinder, while 
rodA is the cross area of rod) 
5. 
( ) 12 2
0.043rod cyl rodcyl
r A A
r m
π
π
⎡ ⎤+ −= =⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
       
6. Cylinder thickness The actuator had to cater for 2.5 times the nominal 
system pressure, but that they were often design to cater for 4 times. 
2 2
0
2
02
cyl
burst
r r
P
r
δ ⎡ ⎤−= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, 2445 /MN mδ =  so 0 0.069r m=  
 
7. Thickness of cylinder, 0 0.026thickness cylr r r m= − =  
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A13 Power Requirement and Mass of Actuation System 
A13.1 Some factors about power requirement 
When the writer estimated the power of actuators, some factors needed to be 
considered. First, time is critical for it has close relation with power. Second, the 
efficiency of power transfer, that is, mechanical power to hydraulic power and 
hydraulic power to electrical power is necessary to thought of. Third, the power 
needed is various during the flight, so the peak power and the average power is 
main consideration for an actuator. 
A13.2 Power Estimation 
A13.2.1 Power requirement of Nose Landing Gear 
The landing gear retraction and deployment occurred during the Take-off and 
Landing phase in a flight. Therefore, the calculations for power requirement are 
based on the ratio of work done to time taken for actuation. 
The writer needed to find the peak power and 
average power of actuator. The clues were found 
that the force reached the maximum value when the 
actuator fully retracted, while the retraction is a 
process with acceleration and deceleration. 
It was necessary to discretized time and Force to acquire the force-velocity 
curve. 
F(KN) v(mm/S) T(S) 
0 0 0
6.6708 37.73 0.4
13.3416 75.46 0.8
20.0124 94.33 1.2
Force (kN)= 67.708
Stroke(mm)= 283 
Time Taken (s)= 4 
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26.6832 94.33 1.6
33.354 94.33 2
40.0248 94.33 2.4
46.6956 94.33 2.8
53.3664 75.47 3.2
60.0372 37.73 3.6
66.708 0 4
Table 13-1 Force and velocity variation with Time 
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Figure 13-1 Force and velocity variation curve 
From the curve, the peak mechanical power was got. 
Peak Mechanical Power=4.4 kW 
Peak Hydraulic Power= Peak Mechanical Power/η(pump) 
Peak Electrical Power= Peak Hydraulic Power/η(hydro to electro) 
Where,η(pump)=0.75, η(hydro to electro)=0.9 
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Therefore, the Peak Electrical Power=6.52kW 
The Average Electrical Power=F×Stroke/time=3.56kW 
A13.2.2 Power requirement of Rudder 
The actuator used in rudder is rotary EHA, and its feature could be found in the 
table. 
Deflection(left) 20 ° 
Deflection(right) 20 ° 
Actuator Stroke 48.400 mm 
Angular Stroke 0.349 radians 
Time taken 2.000 s 
Average Velocity 0.175 radians/s 
Stall Load 66.895 KN 
Table 13-2 Feature of Rudder 
The writer referred the method used in MRT-7 to estimate the power 
requirement. First, time and Force was discretized to acquire the force-velocity 
curve. It shows in Table13-3. 
 
 
D.F Time(s) 
Angular V 
(rad/s) 
Torque(KNM)
Theoretical  
Power(Kw) 
1000 0 0 0.35 0 0 
1400 0.1 0.2 0.315 1.392 0.438 
1800 0.2 0.4 0.28 2.749 0.770 
2200 0.3 0.6 0.245 4.039 0.990 
2600 0.4 0.8 0.21 5.230 1.098 
3000 0.5 1 0.175 6.291 1.101 
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3400 0.6 1.2 0.14 7.198 1.008 
3800 0.7 1.4 0.105 7.927 0.832 
4200 0.8 1.6 0.07 8.462 0.592 
4600 0.9 1.8 0.035 8.787 0.308 
5000 1 2 0 8.897 0 
Table 13-3 Velocity and torque various with time 
As noticed in the first column of Table 13-3, the extreme values for Theoretical 
Power are Zero, which can not be possible. 
The writer followed MRT-7 design, and gave a solution to calculate the Power 
as indicated in the second column of Table 13-4. 
Power= T.P + (0.1+[D.F]×0.5) ×
(T.P)max 
Where, T.P = Theoretical Power,  
D.F = Discretization Factor 
(T.P) max=Maximum Theoretical Power. 
It can be seen that the peak power is 
1.486 
KW. The average power is 1.486 × 
0.369=0.55 kW. (0.369 is the ratio of 
Avg/Peak) 
Peak Hydraulic Power= Peak Mechanical 
Power/η(pump) 
Peak Electrical Power= Peak Hydraulic 
Power/η(hydro to electro) 
Where,η(pump)=0.75, η(hydro to 
electro)=0.9 
Therefore, the Peak Electrical 
Power=2.21kW 
The Average Electrical Power=0.815 kW. 
Theoretical  
Power(Kw) 
Power(Kw) 
0 0.11 
0.438 0.606 
0.770 0.990 
0.9904 1.265 
1.098 1.428 
1.101 1.486 
1.008 1.448 
0.832 1.328 
0.592 1.143 
0.308 0.913 
0 0.661 
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A13.2.3 Power requirements for each actuator  
The overall power requirements for the actuation system of Flying Crane were 
listed in the Table 13-4. 
Actuation Electrical Power Requirements 
Control parts No. of 
actuators 
Maximum 
power of 
one actuator 
(kW) 
Maximum 
Power of 
Controlling 
(kW) 
Average Power 
of Controlling 
(kW) 
Ailerons 4 1.76 3.52 1.30 
Elevators 4 3.4 6.8 2.51 
Rudder 3 2.2 4.4 1.62 
Flaps 8 1.15 9.2 3.39 
Slats 10 1 10 3.37 
Spoilers 12 1.5 18 6.64 
Horizontal 
Stabilizer 
1 1.56 1.56 0.57 
Main Landing  
Gear 
retraction 
2 8.46 16.92 6.24 
Nose Landing  
Gear 
retraction 
1 6.52 6.52 2.40 
Main Landing 
Gear breaking 
24 1.14 27.4 27.4 
Nose Wheel 
Steering 
1 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Table 13-4 Actuation Electrical Power Requirements  
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A13.3 Mass estimation 
In the preliminary design phase, it is really difficult to estimate the mass of 
actuators. The writer gave a roughly estimation of mass according to the 
methods in MRT-7 and A-8. 
A13.3.1 Mass Estimation of EHA 
The EHA comprises pump, accumulator, reservoir, and actuator control 
electronic (ACE), in which the ACEs of flight control surfaces, were considered 
by Mr. Lv (Flight Control system designer.) 
The Power to Weight ratio for electrical motor driven pump is 0.5 kW/ kg, and it 
can be used for mass estimation.[3] 
Mass of accumulator and reservoir was considered as 3 kg. 
The ACE used for the Landing gear retraction and steering was considered to 
be 1.5 kg, while the ACE for landing gear break was 1 kg. 
Main Landing Gear retraction actuator: 
Mass of rod= 
2
rod rodr Lπ ρ× ×  ( ρ  is the density of material) 
Mass of cylinder= ( )2 20 cyl cylr r Lπ ρ− × × ( ρ  is the density of material) 
Serial No.  Components Mass (kg)
1 Rod 1 
2 Cylinder 13 
3 Motor- pump 16.9 
4 Accumulator and reservoir 3 
5 ACE 1.5 
6 Additional mass including sensors 1 
 Total  36.4 
Table 13-5 Mass of main landing gear retraction actuator 
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A13.3.2 Mass Estimation of EMA 
When estimating the mass of EMA, followings were considered 
Mass of motor = 3 kg 
Mass of Gear set and universal joint= Mass of rod 
Mass of end connection= Mass of rod/2 
A13.3.3 Mass Estimation of Actuation system 
Table 13-6 was created by following the above explained procedure on each of 
the major actuator in the system. 
Actuator Mass of 
actuator (kg) 
No. of 
actuators 
Total Mass (kg) 
Ailerons 13.25 4 53 
Elevators 17.6 4 70.4 
Rudder 15.85 3 47.55 
Flaps 7.3 8 58.4 
Slats 7 10 70 
Spoilers 8 12 96 
Horizontal Stabilizer 29 1 29 
Main Landing  
Gear retraction 
36.4 2 72.8 
Nose Landing  
Gear retraction 
31 1 31 
Main Landing 
Gear breaking 
4 24 96 
Nose Wheel Steering 25 1 25 
Table 13-6 Mass estimation of actuation system
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APPENDIX B: Electric Power System Functional Hazard Assessment  
Func
tion 
Ref. 
Function 
Description 
Failure 
Conditio
n Ref. 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard 
Description)  
Flight 
Phas
e  
Effect on Aircraft/Occupants  
1. Aircraft 2. Crew 3. Cabin occupants 
Classifica
tion  
Valida
tion 
Verific
ation  
Rema
rk  
24-
4A-1 
Control 
system runs 
independently 
among 
different 115 
v/400Hz 
channels 
24-4A-
1-1a 
Loss of 
115V/400Hz 
channels operating 
independently 
controllability 
G1,G
2 
1. If this function loss, it will result in all 
115V/400Hz power channel loss in the event of 
any channel fault, as a result, all the 115/400Hz 
loads will lose power. 
2. Flight crew will take the relative procedures to 
deal with this circumstance. 
3. None 
  Ⅳ    
24-
4A-1 
Control 
system runs 
independently 
among 
different 115 
v/400Hz 
channels 
24-4A-
1-1b 
Loss of 
115V/400Hz 
channels operating 
independently 
controllability 
T1, 
F1,F2
,F3,F
4,L1 
1. If this function loss, it will result in all 
115V/400Hz power channel loss in the event of 
any channel fault, as a result, all the 115/400Hz 
loads will lose power. 
2. Flight crew will take the relative procedures to 
deal with this circumstance. 
3. The occupant might be injured due to lose 
pressure in cabin or hard landing. 
Ⅱ    
Flight Phase Failure Condition Classification 
Ground Takeoff In Flight Landing 
G1  Aircraft Static with System 
Operating 
G2  Taxi 
T1 
Takeoff 
F1  Climb          F4  Approach  
F2  Cruise         F5  Other (Describe) 
F3  Descent   
L1 Landing 
Ⅰ  Catastrophic 
Ⅱ  Hazardous 
Ⅲ  Major 
Ⅳ  Minor 
Ⅴ  No Safety Effect 
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Func
tion 
Ref. 
Function 
Description 
Failure 
Conditio
n Ref. 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard 
Description)  
Flight 
Phas
e  
Effect on Aircraft/Occupants  
1. Aircraft 2. Crew 3. Cabin occupants 
Classifica
tion  
Valida
tion 
Verific
ation  
Rema
rk  
24-
4A-2 
Control 
system runs in 
parallel among 
different 115 
v/400Hz 
channels 
 
24-4A-
2-1a 
Loss of 
115V/400Hz 
channels operating 
in parallel 
controllability 
G1,G
2 
1. If this function loss, it will prevent power 
transfer from the normal channel to the power 
loss channel, as a result, part of the 115V/400Hz 
channels will lose power. 
2. Flight crew will take the relative procedures to 
deal with this circumstance. 
3. None 
 
  Ⅳ    
24-
4A-2 
Control 
system runs in 
parallel among 
different 115 
v/400Hz 
channels 
 
24-4A-
2-1b 
Loss of 
115V/400Hz 
channels operating 
in parallel 
controllability 
T1, 
F1,F2
,F3,F
4,L1 
1. If this function loss, it will result in all 
115V/400Hz power channel loss in the event of 
any channel fault, as a result, part of the 
115V/400Hz channels will lose power. 
 
2. Flight crew will take the relative procedures to 
deal with this circumstance. 
 
3. None 
 
Ⅲ    
Flight Phase Failure Condition Classification 
Ground Takeoff In Flight Landing 
G1  Aircraft Static with System 
Operating 
G2  Taxi 
T1 
Takeoff 
F1  Climb          F4  Approach  
F2  Cruise         F5  Other (Describe) 
F3  Descent   
L1 Landing 
  CatastrophicⅠ  
  HazardousⅡ  
  MajorⅢ  
  MinorⅣ  
  No Safety EffectⅤ  
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Func
tion 
Ref. 
Function 
Description 
Failure 
Conditio
n Ref. 
Failure Condition 
(Hazard 
Description)  
Flight 
Phas
e  
Effect on Aircraft/Occupants  
1. Aircraft 2. Crew 3. Cabin occupants 
Classifica
tion  
Valida
tion 
Verific
ation  
Rema
rk  
24-
4A-3 
Control 
system runs 
independently 
among 
different 
28VDC 
channels 
 
24-4A-
3-1a 
Loss of 28VDC 
channels operating 
independently 
controllability 
G1,G
2 
1. If this function loss, it will result in all 28VDC 
power channel loss, as a result, all the 28VDC 
loads will loss lose power. 
2. Flight crew will take the relative procedures to 
deal with this circumstance. 
3. None 
  Ⅳ    
24-
4A-3 
Control 
system runs 
independently 
among 
different 
28VDC 
channels 
24-4A-
3-1b 
Loss of 28VDC 
channels operating 
independently 
controllability 
T1, 
F1,F2
,F3, 
F4,F5
,L1 
1. If this function loss, it will result in all 28VDC 
power channel loss, as a result, all the 28VDC 
loads will lose power, the airplane will lose 
control. The reason is that the entire vital loads 
power requirement is 28VDC. 
2. Flight crew will take the relative procedures to 
deal with this circumstance. 
3. The occupants will suffer the severe injury due 
to lose of airplane controllability. 
Ⅰ     
Flight Phase Failure Condition Classification 
Ground Takeoff In Flight Landing 
G1  Aircraft Static with System 
Operating 
G2  Taxi 
T1 
Takeoff 
F1  Climb          F4  Approach  
F2  Cruise         F5  Other (Describe) 
F3  Descent   
L1 Landing 
  CatastrophicⅠ  
  HazardousⅡ  
  MajorⅢ  
  MinorⅣ  
  No Safety EffectⅤ  
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Funct
ion 
Ref. 
Function 
Description 
Failur
e 
Conditio
n Ref. 
Failure Condition
(Hazard 
Description)  
Flig
ht 
Phas
e  
Effect on Aircraft/Occupants  
1. Aircraft 2. Crew 3. Cabin occupants 
Classifi
cation  
Vali
dation
Veri
ficatio
n  
Re
mark  
24-
4A-4 
Control 
system runs 
in parallel 
among 
different 
28VDC 
channels 
24-
4A-4-1a 
Loss of 28VDC 
channels operating 
in parallel 
controllability 
G1,
G2 
1. If this function loss, it will result in all 28VDC 
power channel loss, as a result, part of the 
28VDC channels will lose power. 
 
2. Flight crew will take the relative procedures 
to deal with this circumstance. 
 
3. None 
  Ⅳ    
24-
4A-4 
Control 
system runs 
in parallel 
among 
different 
28VDC 
channels 
24-
4A-4-1b 
Loss of 28VDC 
channels operating 
in parallel 
controllability 
T1, 
F1,F2
,F3, 
F4,F5
,L1 
1. If this function loss, it will result in all 28VDC 
power channel loss, as a result, part of the 
28VDC channels will lose power. 
 
2. Flight crew will take the relative procedures 
to deal with this circumstance.  
 
 3. None 
Ⅲ    
Flight Phase Failure Condition Classification 
Ground Takeoff In Flight Landing 
G1  Aircraft Static with System 
Operating 
G2  Taxi 
T1 
Takeoff 
F1  Climb          F4  Approach  
F2  Cruise         F5  Other (Describe) 
F3  Descent   
L1 Landing 
  CatastrophicⅠ  
  HazardousⅡ  
  MajorⅢ  
  MinorⅣ  
  No Safety EffectⅤ  
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Funct
ion 
Ref. 
Function 
Description 
Failur
e 
Conditio
n Ref. 
Failure Condition
(Hazard 
Description)  
Flig
ht 
Phas
e  
Effect on Aircraft/Occupants  
1. Aircraft 2. Crew 3. Cabin occupants 
Classifi
cation  
Vali
dation
Veri
ficatio
n  
Re
mark  
24-
4A-5 
Control 
system runs 
independentl
y among 
different 
270VDCchan
nels 
 
 
24-
4A-5-1a 
Loss of 270VDC 
channels operating 
independently 
controllability 
G1,
G2 
1. If this function loss, it will result in all 270VDC 
power channel loss in the event of any channel 
fault, as a result, all the 270VDC loads will   lose 
power. 
2. Flight crew will take the relative procedures 
to deal with this circumstance. 
3. None 
  Ⅳ    
24-
4A-5 
Control 
system runs 
independentl
y among 
different 
270VDC 
channels 
 
24-
4A-5-1b 
Loss of 270VDC 
channels operating 
independently 
controllability 
T1, 
F1,F2
,F3,F
4,L1 
1. If this function loss, it will result in all 270VDC 
power channel loss in the event of any channel 
fault, as a result, all the 270VDC loads will lose 
power, Therefore, the aircraft will lose control. 
2. Flight crew will take the relative procedures 
to deal with this circumstance. 
3. The occupants will suffer the severe injury 
due to lose of airplane controllability. 
I     
Flight Phase Failure Condition Classification 
Ground Takeoff In Flight Landing 
G1  Aircraft Static with System 
Operating 
G2  Taxi 
T1 
Takeoff 
F1  Climb          F4  Approach  
F2  Cruise         F5  Other (Describe) 
F3  Descent   
L1 Landing 
  CatastrophicⅠ  
  HazardousⅡ  
  MajorⅢ  
  MinorⅣ  
  No Safety EffectⅤ  
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Func
tion 
Ref. 
Function 
Description 
Failur
e 
Conditio
n Ref. 
Failure Condition
(Hazard 
Description)  
Flig
ht 
Phas
e  
Effect on Aircraft/Occupants  
1. Aircraft 2. Crew 3. Cabin occupants 
Classifi
cation  
Vali
dation
Veri
ficatio
n  
Re
mark  
24
-4A-
6 
Control 
system runs in 
parallel among 
different 
270VDCchann
els 
 
 
24-
4A-6-1a 
Loss of 270VDC 
channels operating 
in parallel 
controllability 
G1,
G2 
1. If this function loss, it will result in all 270VDC 
power channel loss in the event of any channel 
fault, as a result, part of the 270VDC channels will 
lose power. 
2. Flight crew will take the relative procedures 
to deal with this circumstance. 
3. None 
 
  Ⅳ    
24
-4A-
6 
Control 
system runs in 
parallel among 
different 
270VDC 
channels 
 
24-
4A-6-1b 
Loss of 270VDC 
channels operating 
in parallel 
controllability 
T1, 
F1,F2
,F3,F
4,L1 
1. If this function loss, it will result in all 270VDC 
power channel loss in the event of any channel 
fault, as a result, part of the 115V/400Hz channels 
will lose power. 
2. Flight crew will take the relative procedures 
to deal with this circumstance. 
3. None 
Ⅲ    
Flight Phase Failure Condition Classification 
Ground Takeoff In Flight Landing 
G1  Aircraft Static with System 
Operating 
G2  Taxi 
T1 
Takeoff 
F1  Climb          F4  Approach  
F2  Cruise         F5  Other (Describe) 
F3  Descent   
L1 Landing 
  CatastrophicⅠ  
  HazardousⅡ  
  MajorⅢ  
  MinorⅣ  
  No Safety EffectⅤ  
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Func
tion 
Ref. 
Function 
Description 
Failur
e 
Conditio
n Ref. 
Failure Condition
(Hazard 
Description)  
Flig
ht 
Phas
e  
Effect on Aircraft/Occupants  
1. Aircraft 2. Crew 3. Cabin occupants 
Classifi
cation  
Vali
dation
Veri
ficatio
n  
Re
mark  
24
-4B-
1 
Vital loads 
power supply 
control 
24-
4B-1-1a 
Loss of vital 
loads power supply 
control 
G1,
G2 
The aircraft will lose all the vital loads power 
supply. 
The flight crew work load will be increased to 
cope with this emergency circumstance. 
No effect on the passengers 
 
Ⅳ    
24
-4B-
1 
Vital loads 
power supply 
control 
24-
4B-1-1b 
Loss of vital 
loads power supply 
control 
T1,
F1,F2
,F3,F
4,F5,
L1 
The aircraft will lose all the essential loads 
power supply. The aircraft will loss controllability 
The flight crew work load will be excessively 
increased to cope with this emergency 
circumstance 
All the occupants might be seriously injured due 
to lose controllability of the aircraft. 
Ⅰ     
          
Flight Phase Failure Condition Classification 
Ground Takeoff In Flight Landing 
G1  Aircraft Static with System 
Operating 
G2  Taxi 
T1 
Takeoff 
F1  Climb          F4  Approach  
F2  Cruise         F5  Other (Describe) 
F3  Descent   
L1 Landing 
  CatastrophicⅠ  
  HazardousⅡ  
  MajorⅢ  
  MinorⅣ  
  No Safety EffectⅤ  
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Func
tion 
Ref. 
Function 
Description 
Failur
e 
Conditio
n Ref. 
Failure Condition
(Hazard 
Description)  
Flig
ht 
Phas
e  
Effect on Aircraft/Occupants  
1. Aircraft 2. Crew 3. Cabin occupants 
Classifi
cation  
Vali
dation
Veri
ficatio
n  
Re
mark  
24
-4B-
2 
Essential 
loads power 
supply control 
24-
4B-2-1a 
Loss of Essential 
loads power supply 
control 
G1,
G2 
The aircraft will lose all the essential loads 
power supply. The aircraft will loss some 
functions. 
The flight crew work load will be increased to 
cope with this emergency circumstance. 
All the occupants might feel discomfort due to 
some function loss of the aircraft.  
 
Ⅳ  24-4B-2  
24
-4B-
2 
Essential 
loads power 
supply control 
24-
4B-2-1b 
Loss of Essential 
loads power supply 
control 
T1,
F1,F2
,F3,F
4,F5,
L1 
1、The aircraft will lose all the Essential loads 
power supply. The aircraft will significantly lose 
function. 
The flight crew work load will be  increased to 
cope with this emergency circumstance 
All the occupants might feel discomfort due to 
some function loss of the aircraft. 
Ⅰ    
          
Flight Phase Failure Condition Classification 
Ground Takeoff In Flight Landing 
G1  Aircraft Static with System 
Operating 
G2  Taxi 
T1 
Takeoff 
F1  Climb          F4  Approach  
F2  Cruise         F5  Other (Describe) 
F3  Descent   
L1 Landing 
  CatastrophicⅠ  
  HazardousⅡ  
  MajorⅢ  
  MinorⅣ  
  No Safety EffectⅤ  
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Func
tion 
Ref. 
Function 
Description 
Failur
e 
Conditio
n Ref. 
Failure Condition
(Hazard 
Description)  
Flig
ht 
Phas
e  
Effect on Aircraft/Occupants  
1. Aircraft 2. Crew 3. Cabin occupants 
Classifi
cation  
Vali
dation
Veri
ficatio
n  
Re
mark  
24
-4B-
3 
Non-
Essential 
loads power 
supply control 
24-
4B-3-1a 
Loss of Non-
Essential loads 
power supply 
control 
G1,
G2,T1
,F1,F
2,F3,
F4,F5
,L1 
1、The aircraft will lose all the Non-essential 
loads power supply. As a result, The aircraft will 
loss some functions, but it will not effect on 
aircraft performance. 
No effect on crew 
No effect on passengers 
 
Ⅴ    
24
-4B-
3 
Load circuit 
protection 
24-
4B-3-1b 
Loss of load 
circuit protection 
G1,
G2 
1、If this function loss, it will effect on other 
loads operating which is located on the same 
busbar. As a result, it would result in the busbar 
loss. 
2、Flight crew work load will be increased 
3、No effect on occupants 
Ⅳ   24-4B-3 
          
Flight Phase Failure Condition Classification 
Ground Takeoff In Flight Landing 
G1  Aircraft Static with System 
Operating 
G2  Taxi 
T1 
Takeoff 
F1  Climb          F4  Approach  
F2  Cruise         F5  Other (Describe) 
F3  Descent   
L1 Landing 
  CatastrophicⅠ  
  HazardousⅡ  
  MajorⅢ  
  MinorⅣ  
  No Safety EffectⅤ  
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Func
tion 
Ref. 
Function 
Description 
Failur
e 
Conditio
n Ref. 
Failure Condition
(Hazard 
Description)  
Flig
ht 
Phas
e  
Effect on Aircraft/Occupants  
1. Aircraft 2. Crew 3. Cabin occupants 
Classifi
cation  
Vali
dation
Veri
ficatio
n  
Re
mark  
24
-5A 
Load circuit 
protection 
24-
5A-1 
Loss of load 
circuit protection 
T1,
F1,F2
,F3,F
4,F5,
L1 
1、If this function loss, it will effect on other 
loads operating which is located on the same 
busbar. As a result, it would result in the busbar 
loss. Because the loads on this busbar are mixed. 
If the vital loads are affected, It will threaten flight 
safety. 
2、Flight crew work load will be significantly 
increased 
3、No effect on occupants 
Ⅲ   24-5A 
24
-5B 
Main feeder 
protection 
24-
5B-1a 
Loss of main 
feeder protection 
G1,
G2 
If this function loss, it will result in large amount 
of power loss even cause fire due to high current 
level.  
Flight crew work load will be significantly 
increased 
Occupants might be injured due to fire, but the 
majority occupants can survive by emergency 
evacuation. 
 
Ⅲ    
Flight Phase Failure Condition Classification 
Ground Takeoff In Flight Landing 
G1  Aircraft Static with System 
Operating 
G2  Taxi 
T1 
Takeoff 
F1  Climb          F4  Approach  
F2  Cruise         F5  Other (Describe) 
F3  Descent   
L1 Landing 
  CatastrophicⅠ  
  HazardousⅡ  
  MajorⅢ  
  MinorⅣ  
  No Safety EffectⅤ  
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Func
tion 
Ref. 
Function 
Description 
Failur
e 
Conditio
n Ref. 
Failure Condition
(Hazard 
Description)  
Flig
ht 
Phas
e  
Effect on Aircraft/Occupants  
1. Aircraft 2. Crew 3. Cabin occupants 
Classifi
cation  
Vali
dation
Veri
ficatio
n  
Re
mark  
24
-5B 
Main feeder 
protection 
24-
5B-1b 
Loss of main 
feeder protection 
T1, 
F1,F2
,F3,F
4,F5,
L1 
If this function loss, it will result in large amount 
of power loss even cause fire due to high current 
level.  
Flight crew work load will be significantly 
increased 
Occupants might be injured due to fire. 
Ⅱ    
24
-5C 
Busbar 
protection 
24-
5C-1a 
Loss of Busbar 
protection 
G1,
G2 
If this function loss, it will result in large amount 
of power loss even cause fire due to high current 
level.  
Flight crew work load will be significantly 
increased 
Occupants might be injured due to fire, but the 
majority occupants can survive by emergency 
evacuation. 
 
Ⅲ  24-5C 
Bus 
bar 
prote
ction 
Flight Phase Failure Condition Classification 
Ground Takeoff In Flight Landing 
G1  Aircraft Static with System 
Operating 
G2  Taxi 
T1 
Takeoff 
F1  Climb          F4  Approach  
F2  Cruise         F5  Other (Describe) 
F3  Descent   
L1 Landing 
  CatastrophicⅠ  
  HazardousⅡ  
  MajorⅢ  
  MinorⅣ  
  No SafⅤ ety Effect 
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Func
tion 
Ref. 
Function 
Description 
Failur
e 
Conditio
n Ref. 
Failure Condition
(Hazard 
Description)  
Flig
ht 
Phas
e  
Effect on Aircraft/Occupants  
1. Aircraft 2. Crew 3. Cabin occupants 
Classifi
cation  
Vali
dation
Veri
ficatio
n  
Re
mark  
24
-5C 
Busbar 
protection 
24-
5C-1b 
Loss of Busbar 
protection 
T1,
F1,F2
,F3,F
4,F5,
L1 
1、If this function loss, it will result in large 
amount of power loss even cause fire due to high 
current level.  
Flight crew work load will be significantly 
increased 
Occupants might be injured due to fire. 
Ⅱ  24-5C 
Bus
bar 
prote
ction 
24
-6A 
System 
internal 
data(signal)ex
change 
24-
6A-1a 
Loss of inter 
data transfer 
G1,
G2 
If this function loss, it will significant effect on 
electric power distribution capability, as a result 
the vast range of airframe systems will be 
affected.  
Flight crew work load will be increased 
3. No effect on occupants. 
Ⅳ    
          
Flight Phase Failure Condition Classification 
Ground Takeoff In Flight Landing 
G1  Aircraft Static with System 
Operating 
G2  Taxi 
T1 
Takeoff 
F1  Climb          F4  Approach  
F2  Cruise         F5  Other (Describe) 
F3  Descent   
L1 Landing 
  CatastrophicⅠ  
  HazardousⅡ  
  MajorⅢ  
  MinorⅣ  
  No Safety EffectⅤ  
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Func
tion 
Ref. 
Function 
Description 
Failur
e 
Conditio
n Ref. 
Failure Condition
(Hazard 
Description)  
Flig
ht 
Phas
e  
Effect on Aircraft/Occupants  
1. Aircraft 2. Crew 3. Cabin occupants 
Classifi
cation  
Vali
dation
Veri
ficatio
n  
Re
mark  
24
-6A 
System 
internal 
data(signal)ex
change 
24-
6A-1b 
Loss of inter 
data transfer 
T1,
F1,F2
,F3,F
4,F5,
L1 
If this function loss, it will significant effect on 
electric power distribution capability, as a result 
the vast range of airframe systems will be 
affected.  
Flight crew work load will be significant 
increased 
Occupants will feel uncomfortable due to some 
systems function loss. 
Ⅲ    
24
-6B 
External 
data exchange
24-
6B-1 
Loss of external 
data exchange 
G1,
G2,F1
,F2,F
3,F4,
F5,L1
If this function loss, electric power system 
function can not be provided to flight crew 
immediately, but since system operate 
automatically, and EPS operates well or not can 
reflected indirectly by other system information. 
So no effects on aircraft operational capability. 
Ⅴ     
          
Flight Phase Failure Condition Classification 
Ground Takeoff In Flight Landing 
G1  Aircraft Static with System 
Operating 
G2  Taxi 
T1 
Takeoff 
F1  Climb          F4  Approach  
F2  Cruise         F5  Other (Describe) 
F3  Descent   
L1 Landing 
  CatastrophicⅠ  
  HazardousⅡ  
  MajorⅢ  
  MinorⅣ  
  No Safety EffectⅤ  
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APPENDIX C: FMEA of EPS 
Identification 
number 
Item Failure Modes 
and Causes 
Flight/Mission 
Phase 
Local Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Severity  
Level 
11 Generator1  Failure of 
excitation 
Flight low power 
factor 
decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce power 
supply capability 
Major 
  Interphase 
short circuits 
Flight loss power 
output 
decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce power 
supply capability 
Major 
  Single phase to 
earth fault 
Flight unbalanced 
power output 
decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce power 
supply capability 
Major 
  Inter turn faults Ground and 
Flight 
Generator 
failure 
decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce power 
supply capability 
Major 
  Earth fault on 
rotor 
Flight increased 
vibration in the 
alternator 
decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce power 
supply capability 
Major 
12 GCU1 Circuit fault 
(open or short) 
Flight GCU1 failure decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce power 
supply capability 
Major 
13 Generator2  Failure of 
excitation 
Flight low power 
factor 
decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce power 
supply capability 
Major 
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Identification 
number 
Item Failure Modes 
and Causes 
Flight/Mission 
Phase 
Local Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Severity  
Level 
13 Generator2  Interphase 
short circuits 
Flight loss power 
output 
decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce power 
supply capability 
Major 
  Single phase to 
earth fault 
Flight unbalanced 
power output 
decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce power 
supply capability 
Major 
  Inter turn faults Ground and 
Flight 
Generator 
failure 
decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce power 
supply capability 
Major 
  Earth fault on 
rotor 
Flight increased 
vibration in the 
alternator 
decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce power 
supply capability 
Major 
14 GCU2 Circuit fault 
(open or short) 
Flight GCU2 failure decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce power 
supply capability 
Major 
15 Generator3 
(APU)  
Failure of 
excitation 
one or two 
main 
generators 
failure 
low power 
factor 
decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce emergency 
power supply 
capability 
Hazardous 
  Interphase 
short circuits 
one or two 
main 
generators 
failure 
loss power 
output 
decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce emergency 
power supply 
capability 
Hazardous 
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Identification 
number 
Item Failure Modes 
and Causes 
Flight/Mission 
Phase 
Local Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Severity  
Level 
15 Generator3 
(APU)  
Single phase 
to earth fault 
one or two 
main 
generators 
failure 
unbalanced 
power output 
decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce emergency 
power supply 
capability 
Hazardous 
  Inter turn faults one or two 
main 
generators 
failure 
Generator 
failure 
decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce emergency 
power supply 
capability 
Hazardous 
  Earth fault on 
rotor 
one or two 
main 
generators 
failure 
increased 
vibration in the 
alternator 
decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce emergency 
power supply 
capability 
Hazardous 
16 GCU3 Circuit fault 
(open or short)
one or two 
main 
generators 
failure 
GCU3 failure decrease the supply 
voltage and the stability 
of the system 
Reduce emergency 
power supply 
capability 
Hazardous 
17 GCB1 Failure to trip 
due to an open 
or short in the 
trip circuit 
wiring 
Flight Failure to trip over current and make 
generators paralleled 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Major 
  Failure to trip 
due to an open 
or short in the 
trip coil 
Flight Failure to trip over current and make 
generators paralleled 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Major 
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Identification 
number 
Item Failure Modes 
and Causes 
Flight/Mission 
Phase 
Local Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Severity  
Level 
17 GCB1 Failure to trip 
due to 
mechanism 
problem 
Flight Failure to trip over current and make 
generators paralleled 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Major 
  Failure to clear 
by mechanism 
problem 
Flight Failure to clear over current and make 
generators paralleled 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Major 
  Failure to clear 
by dielectric 
Flight Failure to clear over current and make 
generators paralleled 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Major 
18 GCB2 Failure to trip 
due to an open 
or short in the 
trip circuit wiring
Flight Failure to trip over current and make 
generators paralleled 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Major 
  Failure to trip 
due to an open 
or short in the 
trip coil 
Flight Failure to trip over current and make 
generators paralleled 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Major 
  Failure to trip 
due to 
mechanism 
problem 
Flight Failure to trip over current and make 
generators paralleled 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Major 
  Failure to clear 
by mechanism 
problem 
Flight Failure to clear over current and make 
generators paralleled 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Major 
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Identification 
number 
Item Failure Modes 
and Causes 
Flight/Mission 
Phase 
Local Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Severity  
Level 
18 GCB2 Failure to clear 
by dielectric 
Flight Failure to clear over current and make 
generators paralleled 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Major 
19 BPCU1 Failure to trip  Flight Failure to trip over current and make 
generators paralleled 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Major 
  Failure to clear Flight Failure to clear over current and make 
generators paralleled 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Major 
110 BPCU2 Failure to trip Ground Failure to trip over current over current Minor 
  Failure to clear Ground Failure to clear Over current Over current Minor 
111 BPCU3 Failure to trip Ground Failure to trip over current over current Minor 
  Failure to clear Ground Failure to clear Over current Over current Minor 
201 Frequency 
Modulation1 
Overfrequency/ 
underfrequency
Flight Overfrequency/ 
underfrequency 
decrease power quality Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Minor 
  Overvoltage/ 
undervoltage 
Flight Overvoltage/ 
undervoltage 
decrease power quality Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Minor 
  Internal circuit 
open 
Flight Loss power decrease CF AC power 
capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Minor 
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Identification 
number 
Item Failure Modes 
and Causes 
Flight/Mission 
Phase 
Local Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Severity  
Level 
201 Frequency 
Modulation1 
Internal circuit 
short 
Flight Loss power decrease CF AC 
power capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Major 
202 Frequency 
Modulation2 
Overfrequency/ 
underfrequency 
Flight Overfrequency/ 
underfrequency 
decrease power 
quality 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Minor 
  Overvoltage/ 
undervoltage 
Flight Overvoltage/ 
undervoltage 
decrease power 
quality 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Minor 
  Internal circuit 
open 
Flight Loss power decrease CF AC 
power capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Minor 
  Internal circuit 
short 
Flight Loss power decrease CF AC 
power capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Major 
203 H TRU1 Overvoltage/ 
undervoltage 
Flight Overvoltage/ 
undervoltage 
decrease power 
quality 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Minor 
  Internal circuit 
open 
Flight Loss power decrease 270v DC 
power capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Minor 
  Internal circuit 
short 
Flight Loss power decrease  270v DC  
power capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Major 
204 H TRU2 Overvoltage/ 
undervoltage 
Flight Overvoltage/ 
undervoltage 
decrease power 
quality 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Minor 
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Identification 
number 
Item Failure Modes 
and Causes 
Flight/Mission 
Phase 
Local Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Severity  
Level 
204 H TRU2 Internal circuit 
open 
Flight Loss power decrease  270v DC  
power capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Minor 
  Internal circuit 
short 
Flight Loss power decrease 270v DC  
power capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Major 
205 L TRU1 Overvoltage/ 
undervoltage 
Flight Overvoltage/ 
undervoltage 
decrease power 28v DC 
quality 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Minor 
  Internal circuit 
open 
Flight Loss power decrease 28v DC power 
capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Minor 
205 L TRU1 Internal circuit 
short 
Flight Loss power decrease  28v DC  
power capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Major 
206 L TRU2 Overvoltage/ 
undervoltage 
Flight Overvoltage/ 
undervoltage 
decrease power 28v DC 
quality 
Decrease the 
stability of the 
system 
Minor 
  Internal circuit 
open 
Flight Loss power decrease 28v DC power 
capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Minor 
  Internal circuit 
short 
Flight Loss power decrease  28v DC  
power capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Major 
207 BTB1 Fails to open 
due to 
mechanism 
problem 
Flight Fails to open possibly connect APU to 
Generator 1 
None Minor 
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Identification 
number 
Item Failure Modes and 
Causes 
Flight/Mission 
Phase 
Local Effect Next Higher Effect End Effect Severity  
Level 
207 BTB1 Fails to close due to 
mechanism problem 
or internal circuit 
failure 
Flight with 
Generator 1 
failure 
Fails to close Disconnect APU 
Generator to main 
AC Bus 
Decrease 
emergency 
power 
capability  
Hazardous 
208 BTB2 Fails to open due to 
mechanism problem 
Flight Fails to open possibly connect 
APU to Generator 
2 
None Minor 
  Fails to close due to 
mechanism problem 
or internal circuit 
failure 
Flight with 
Generator 2 
failure 
Fails to close Disconnect APU 
Generator to main 
AC Bus 
Decrease 
emergency 
power 
capability  
Hazardous 
209 BTB3 Fails to close due to 
mechanism problem 
or internal circuit 
failure 
Flight with 
LTRU1 1 failure 
Fails to close decrease  28v DC  
power capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Major 
210 BTB4 Fails to close due to 
mechanism problem 
or internal circuit 
failure 
Flight with 
LTRU2 failure 
Fails to close decrease  28v DC  
power capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Major 
211 BTB5 Fails to close due to 
mechanism problem 
or internal circuit 
failure 
Flight with 
HTRU 1 failure 
Fails to close decrease  270v DC  
power capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Major 
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Identification 
number 
Item Failure Modes and 
Causes 
Flight/Mission 
Phase 
Local Effect Next Higher 
Effect 
End Effect Severity  
Level 
212 BTB6 Fails to close due to 
mechanism problem 
or internal circuit 
failure 
Flight with 
HTRU 2 failure 
Fails to close decrease  270v DC  
power capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Major 
213 BTB7 Fails to close due to 
mechanism problem 
or internal circuit 
failure 
Flight with 
Frequency 
Modulation 1 
failure 
Fails to close decrease 115v CF 
AC  power 
capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Major 
214 BTB8 Fails to close due to 
mechanism problem 
or internal circuit 
failure 
Flight with 
Frequency 
Modulation 2 
failure 
Fails to close decrease  115V CF 
AC power 
capability 
Reduce power 
capability 
Major 
215 BTB9 Fails to close due to 
mechanism problem 
or internal circuit 
failure 
Ground and 
Flight 
Fails to close loss capability to 
charge Battery1 
None None 
216 BTB10 Fails to close due to 
mechanism problem 
or internal circuit 
failure 
Ground and 
Flight 
Fails to close loss capability to 
charge Battery2 
None None 
217 BCRU1 Open or short in 
internal circuit 
Ground and 
Flight 
BCRU1 failure loss capability to 
charge Battery1 
None None 
218 BCRU2 Open or short in 
internal circuit 
Ground and 
Flight 
BCRU2 failure loss capability to 
charge Battery2 
None None 
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Identification 
number 
Item Failure Modes and 
Causes 
Flight/Mission 
Phase 
Local Effect Next Higher 
Effect 
End Effect Severity  
Level 
219 BTB11 Fails to close due to 
mechanism problem or 
internal circuit failure 
Flight with main 
generator failure
Fails to close Reduce capability 
to power ESS DC 
Bus 
Reduce vital 
power 
capability 
Hazardous 
220 BTB12 Fails to close due to 
mechanism problem or 
internal circuit failure 
Flight with main 
generator failure
Fails to close Reduce capability 
to power ESS DC 
Bus 
Reduce vital 
power 
capability 
Hazardous 
221 ESS LTRU Internal circuit open or 
short 
Flight with 
generators 
failure 
ESS LTRU 
failure 
Reduce capability 
to power ESS DC 
Bus 
Reduce vital 
power 
capability 
Hazardous 
222 BTB13 Fails to close due to 
mechanism problem or 
internal circuit failure 
Flight with main 
generators 
failure 
Fails to close Reduce capability 
to power ESS DC 
Bus 
Reduce vital 
power 
capability 
Hazardous 
223 STAT INV Internal circuit open or 
short 
Flight with 
generators 
failure 
STAT INV 
Failure 
loss capability to 
power 115v CF 
AC BUS 
Reduce 
emergency 
power 
capability 
Hazardous 
224 DC/DC Internal circuit open or 
short 
Flight with 
generators 
failure 
DC/DC failure loss capability to 
power 270v DC 
BUS 
Reduce 
emergency 
power 
capability 
Hazardous 
31 Microproce
ssor 
Module1 
Malfunction Flight Malfunction decrease 
reliability of 
system 
Reduce power 
supply 
capability 
Major 
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APPENDIX D: FTA OF EPS 
Loss power supply of 28V DC (1) 
 131 
Loss power supply of 28V DC (2) 
 132 
Loss power supply of 270V DC (1) 
 133 
Loss power supply of 270V DC (2) 
 134 
Loss power supply of 115V/400HZ AC (1) 
 135 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Loss power supply of 115V/400HZ AC (2) 
